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ABSTRACT 
The Master thesis main aim is to analyze the Federal Reserve monetary policies effect over some 
selected profitability variables. The sample considers the fifty major American banks with respect 
to the average assets recorded in the 31/12/2017 balance sheet. In particular, it is deeply illustrated 
the effect of the Fed Funds interest rate1 reduction during the Financial crisis 2007-2009. 
The first Chapter is the introduction, which is splitted into two sections. On one hand, it is reported 
the Federal Reserve history, its successes and fails during almost one century of activity.  
In the second section, it is briefly reported the financial collapse, its causes and consequences. 
Chapter two is dedicated to a deeply explanation of all the tools which the Federal Reserve could 
implement. It is, then, described the instruments used before, during and subsequently the Financial 
crisis to recovery the economy.  
The third reports the literature review, which is an important section of the thesis since it is included 
the main previous studies on which the final elaboration is based. 
In the last Chapter is explained which are the profitability variables selected and their construction. 
In the end, it is illustrated the main hypothesis which are accepted or rejected by the econometric 
analysis. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
1 https://apps.newyorkfed.org/markets/autorates/fed-funds-search-result-page 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 THE FEDERAL RESERVE  
The Federal Reserve was created in 1914 by the Congress and the U.S.A. president Woodrow 
Wilson, in order to smooth the concerns about the financial system stability.  
Until the beginning of the 90ies, a Central Bank did not exist and, as consequences, all the action 
promoting the stability of the financial system was conducted by private institutions.  
These were, definitely, not sufficient due to a lack of sources and credibility that, instead, was 
properly of an independent Central Bank. Furthermore, the public did not believe that a private 
institution could work towards its interests. 
The United States, then, had to institute a lender of last resort in order to stop the “bank runs” that 
were not rare in this period.  
The Congress main aim, therefore, was to promote the financial and monetary stability through the 
Federal Reserve2. 
 
1.1.1 The Gold Standard 
The historic environment played an important role. In particular, during the period between the 
1879 Civil War and 1933 the United States was peg to the “Gold Standard”.  
It was a regime in which the currency was convertible with gold at a fixed exchange rate, set by 
each state and that, today by the modern economists, is absolutely not consider perfect. 
The Gold Standard, indeed, had a huge effect on the Central Bank money supply. Since it was 
determined by the fixed exchange with gold, the monetary policies power, aimed to the stabilization 
of the economy, were really weak. In particular, the regime neutralized the monetary authority 
flexibility in reducing the interest rate during a recession or in increasing it to stop the inflation 
growth. As consequence, the economic system was characterized by a further volatility with respect 
to the production and the inflation which, indeed, highlighted a trend more erratic than modern 
time.  
Another important weakness was the fixed exchange rate between the countries.  
Since their own currencies were linked to an ounce of gold, automatically the currency exchange 
became fixed and it could not fluctuate as today3.  
                                                          
2 Ben S. Bernanke, “La Federal Reserve e la crisi finanziaria, Quattro lezioni”, Chapter 1. 
3 The Gold Standard was partially controlled by the Central Banks but, in the end, it created an alternative and automatic 
monetary system. 
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The fixed peg, furthermore, brought to a speculative attacks vulnerability since the banks had not 
a sufficient quantity of gold to convert all the currency in circulation. If a loss of credibility 
occurred, it would be possible to have a “bank run” looking for changing more money as possible. 
This is the United Kingdom 1931 scenario that had constrained the country to exit from the regime4. 
The Gold standard was able to stabilize the inflation but only in the long period, that is, at least 10 
years. In the short period, indeed, it could produce huge inflation or deflation, since the money 
supply depended on the quantity of gold.  
For instance, if in California a new deposit of gold was discovered, the quantity in the economy 
increased and this produced inflation. In the other hand if the economy grew up, it would be 
produced deflation. This volatility penalized, in particular, people that had linked their revenues to 
the production and sale of goods. During the deflation, the market price continued to decrease but 
the debt with the bank remained stable5.  
These problems were one of the reasons that point to the creation of the Federal Reserve.  
In 1913, the Congress approved the Federal Reserve Act which assigned to the new Central Bank 
two important functions, that is, being the lender of last resort, in order to smooth the bank runs, 
and to control the Gold Standard, reducing the interest rate fluctuations.  
The Federal Reserve, anyway, was the positive result of the third tentative. The first and second, 
indeed, did not have the support of the entrepreneurial world, i.e. Main Street, which believed that 
the Central Bank was created just to help the financial system, i.e. Wall Street.  
The President Wilson’s solution, therefore, was to create twelve Federal Reserve Banks located in 
the same number of U.S cities, as shown in Figure 96, subjecting all the system to the supervision 
of the Board of Governors, which meets in Washington D.C. 
This structure had the advantage to create a Central Bank in which all the regions could participate 
by sending economics information to Washington, which set a monetary policy based on the whole 
country opinion. 
                                                          
4 That is, the UK Central Bank had few reserves and everybody believed in its capacity to defend the Gold Standard. When the 
speculators had some doubts about its soundness, the country was obliged to exit from the regime.  
5 Ben S. Bernanke, “La Federal Reserve e la crisi finanziaria, Quattro lezioni”, Chapter 1. Taking the example of a farmer that links 
its income to the products sale. If the selling price decreases, the income decreases as well but the debt with the bank remains 
the same.
6 Source: The Federal Reserve System: Purpose and Functions, System Publication. 
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Figure9   The Federal Reserve districts (∆), the Federal Reserve seats (●) and the Board of Governors (꙳) 
 
1.1.2 The Great Depression and the World War II 
The twenties were a prosperity period for the United States being, indeed, the main economic force 
after the First World War, which destroyed the principal European cities. 
The Federal Reserve, then, had the time to grow up in a positive clime until the 1929 Great 
Depression, as shown in Figure 107. 
 
 
Figure 10         The Index S&P Composite, 1929-1933  
                                                          
7  Source: Center for Research in Securities Prices, Index File on the S&P 500. The stock market Index reached almost 130 points 
before the Great Depression which, instead, reduced it by almost 60 points in a short period. The lowest pick is recorded in 1932 
when the stock market Index was lower than 20. 
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In this period the national GDP constantly decreased and the unemployment, vice versa, constantly 
increased, reaching a pick of almost 25% in 1931-1932, as shown in Figure 118. 
 
 
Figure 11                    The unemployment rate from 1910 to 1960 
 
The recession stopped in 1941, following the Pearl Harbor disaster, when the United Stated of 
America entered into the Second World War.  
The Fed, in front of its first emergency, failed to set a right monetary policy and to stabilize the 
financial system.  
About monetary policy, the Central Bank did not implement an expansionary action that today is 
common during a period of huge recession. This lack of intervention had, as consequence, a sharp 
flection of the price and, probably, this occurred on the base of the UK 1931 experience.  
In addition, the Federal Reserve increased the interest rate, instead of decreased it, in order to attract 
foreign capitals and to not exit from the Gold Standard. In 1933, the president Franklin Delano 
Roosevelt abandoned the regime and the economy of the country restarted.  
                                                          
8 Source: Historical Statistics of the United States, Millennial Edition. The shadow area represented the Great Depression period. 
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About the financial stability, the Federal Reserve failed to be the lender of last resort. During the 
bank run, indeed, the authority did not intervene and a huge number of institutions went into 
bankruptcy9.  
In 1934, then, was introduced the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (F.D.I.C.), that had to 
grant the bank’s deposits, neutralizing the bank run. 
The World War II interrupted the Great Depression and the unemployment decreased due to a 
massive hire of workers by the firms sustaining the national army.  
During a conflict the country government, usually, financed the military operations through the 
increasing of the public debt and, indeed, the USA one sharply increased. This time the Fed used 
its power to move the interest rate, keeping the public debt at a low level and reducing the cost of 
the war. At the end of the global War, the American government tried to convince the Fed to 
maintain the low interest rate but the Central Bank was afraid that such level could increase the 
inflation. After many negotiations with the Treasure, in 1951 it obtained to set independently the 
interest rate.   
This fundamental agreement was called the “Fed-Treasury Accord” and for the first time the 
government recognized the operative independency of the American Central Bank.  
Today, almost all the economists of the world believe that the independent Central Banks could 
achieve better results if they are not influenced by the Government authority. In particular, an 
independent organism can ignore the political pressure to stimulate the economics during the 
elections and, then, to assume a longer term prospective and a more efficient action.  
 
2.1.3 The stagflation and the great moderation 
In the 50ies and 60ies, the Federal Reserve first aim was to maintain the macroeconomic stability.  
In this period was not difficult to conduct the monetary policies since, after the World War II, the 
U.S.A. economics was growing fastly.  
From 1951 to 1970, the Federal Reserve President William Machesney defined the inflation a “thief 
in the night”, which had to be stabilized increasing the interest rates when the economics grew too 
fast and, when necessary, decreasing them in order to avoid a recession. This anticyclical monetary 
policy was called by the authority “leaning against the wind”.  
                                                          
9 Source: Federal Reserve, Banking and Monetary Statistics, 1914-1941, table 66. The highest pick was reached in 1933-1934, 
when the number of failed banks raised to 4000.  
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From the first half of the 60ies, though, the monetary policy was too expansive bringing to a sharp 
increase of the price growth and the expected inflation. As shown in figure 1210, it was on an 
average of 1% but, during the Vietnam war (1965-1969), it started to increase until it reached a 
pick of 13% at the end of the 70ies. 
 
 
Figure 12   The Consumer Price Index (CPI) Inflation from 1960-1964 al 1980 
 
The main reason of setting a so huge expansionary monetary policy was related to the optimism 
that the monetary authority had about the possibility of stimulating the economics without causing 
inflationism pressure. The Federal Reserve, indeed, following this approach, believed that the 
employment could permanently increase, maintaining the inflation level a little bit higher than the 
average.  
In particular, the economists based their conclusions on the so called “fine tuning theory”, that is, 
the monetary and fiscal policies could maintain perfectly stable the economic. This approach, 
though, has brought to a sharp increase of the inflation without favoring the unemployment 
decreasing.  
                                                          
10 Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics 
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In 1979, the authority president Paul Volcker and the “Federal Open Market Committee”, the 
organism which has to formulate the monetary policies, raised the interest rate breaking the 
inflation loop and diminishing the price growth, as shown in Figure 1311. 
 
Figure 13    Consumer Price Index (CPI) Inflation from 1980 to 1987 
 
The inflation decreased but had some consequences. The economic contracted and the 
unemployment increased reaching a level of 11% in the 1982, Figure 1412. 
 
 
Figure 14    The unemployment rate from 1979 to 1987 
                                                          
11 Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics. We can see a sharp decreasing of the Index due to the Fed president’s decisions. The 
percentage variation is computed from the end of the periods. 
 
12 Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics. The variation is percentual and the values are taken at the end of each period. 
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This episode highlighted the importance of being an independent organism. Indeed, it would be not 
possible to achieve the inflation lower level, if the Central Bank had received political pressure by 
the Government.  
In the 1987 Volcker was substituted by Alan Greenspan who was the president until the Financial 
Crisis in 2007-2008.  
This period was called “Great moderation” due to an incredible economic stability, opposite to the 
“Great Depression” of the 30ies and the “Stagflation period” of the 70ies.  
In Figure 1513 was reported the inflation and economics growth volatility. During this period, they 
were stable due, in particular, to the Volcker’s monetary policy, which had some negative 
consequences in the short period, i.e. unemployment and economic contraction, but that had a huge 
success in the long period. 
 
 
Figure 15    The real GDP growth from 1950 to 2010 
 
Until the Financial Crisis, the U.S.A. economics was stable. Only the 2001 dot-cum bubble created 
a little recession, which was nothing compares to the following Crisis that hit the whole World. 
 
                                                          
13 Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis. The dates are quarterly and the shadow areas represent the ± 1 standard deviation 
interval around the average of the period considered. 
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2.2 THE FINANCIAL CRISIS  
One of the main causes of the 2007-2008 financial crisis was the sharp raise of the real estate prices. 
As shown in Figure 1614, from the beginning of the 90ies until the 2008 the house prices trend 
raised up of almost 130%. Furthermore, the mortgage supply deteriorated. 
 
 
Figure 16    The single-family house price from 1980-2005 
 
The real estate bubble was, especially, a psychological consequence due to the huge optimism 
deriving from the previous years. People, indeed, started to believe that the house prices continued 
to increase and, then, purchasing houses was a free-risk investment.  
In addition, the mortgage constraints became weaker.  
For instance, at the end of the 90ies, to purchase a house, a borrower had to give an anticipation of 
10%, 15% or 20% of the real estate value and had to present a detailed documentation of its own 
financial situation.  
At the beginning of the 2000, though, the credit institutions granted mortgages also to borrowers 
less qualify, so called “non-prime”, that, often, did not have the sufficient documentation. 
 
 
                                                          
14 Source: CoreLogic. 
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Figure 1715 showed the percentage of the new “non-prime” mortgages.  
 
 
Figure 17  The percentage of new “non-prime” mortgages on the total real estate mortgages from 1995 to 2009 
 
Figure 1816 showed the level of the income with respect to the mortgage monthly payment. As we 
could see, the monthly payment absorbed a huge part of the income available of the families, raising 
the house prices until its highest level in 2006 when the demand started to decrease.  
 
 
Figure 18        The income level with respect to the mortgage monthly payment 
                                                          
15 Source: Federal Reserve specialists' estimations, based on the “Inside Mortgage Finance” dates. The percentage of new “non-
prime” mortgages on the total real estate mortgages from 1995 to 2009. 
16 Source: Federal Reserve Board. The values are expressed as a percentage of the available income. 
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The demand diminishing burst the bubble and the price of the real estate collapsed.  
As shown in Figure 1917, the house prices decreased of almost 30% from 2006. 
 
 
Figure 19      Single-family house prices from 1980 to 2010 
 
People who believed being reach became, immediately, poor since the residual debt due to the 
banks was higher than the house value. Furthermore, the bubble hit the credit institutions as well 
and the banks lost a huge amount of richness in term of stock value. 
In particular, the amount lost was similar to the one that incurred during the dot-com bubble burst, 
but the 2007 recession consequences were extremely higher.  
In order to understand this point, it was useful to analyze the factors which burst the bubble and 
the vulnerabilities of the system.  
The triggers were the house prices fallen and the mortgage losses, instead the vulnerabilities 
involved both the private and the public sectors.  
With respect to the private sector, too many borrowers had too many debts. In addition, banks were 
not able to monitor and to value the risks linked to the new and more sophisticated financial 
operations.  
A third problem was related to the banks massive use of the “commercial paper”, that is, 
instruments that could have maturity the day after and no more than three months. 
                                                          
17 Source: CoreLogic. The Index is built taking as main pillars January 2000 = 100. 
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The credit institutions, then, recorded in their balance sheets a huge quantity of these kind of debt 
instruments which could be claimed in any time.  
The last private weakness was the use of the “Credit Default Swap”, C.D.S., by the AIG Financial18 
products corporation. AIG, indeed, granted an insurance to the investors over securities 
investments but, when the bubble burst and the system collapsed, it suffered a huge lost.  
In addition, the public sector had some important vulnerabilities. 
The financial regulations were, still, based on the Great Depression structure. It did not change 
during the years and, then, many big institutions, as AIG, or big investment banks, as Lehman 
Brothers, were not subject to an adequate supervision.  
Furthermore, the Federal Reserve did not urge the holding banks on developing new risk measurers, 
in order to limit their risk operations and it did not sufficiently protect the consumers. The American 
Central Bank, indeed, had the power to guarantee some particular protection forms which, if used 
efficiently, would have counteracted the bad credit practices actuated until the bubble burst.  
The new authority President Ben S. Bernanke actuated this power only in 2007, when it was too 
late19. 
 
2.2.1 Consequences 
About the consequences, the 2007-2008 crisis had huge negative effects on the economy. 
Figure 2020 represents an index of financial intensity whose highest pick is registered in 2007-2008.  
 
 
Figure 20                                                            Financial Intensity Index from 1994 to 2012 
                                                          
18 A.I.G., that is, the American International Group. One of the biggest and most important U.S.A. insurance company. 
19 Ben S. Bernanke, “La Federal Reserve e la crisi finanziaria, Quattro lezioni”, Chapter 2. 
20 Source: St. Louis Federal Reserve. 
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The stock market collapsed, Figure 2121, together with the real estate market, which had a huge 
reduction of new houses building sector. Figure 2222, indeed, highlighted that the house market 
value in 2012 is still far away from the one reached before the system collapse, in 2005-2006.  
 
 
Figure 21     S&P 500 Composite Index from 1992 to 2012 
 
 
Figure 22          The building sector of new houses 
 
The unemployment reached a pick of 10%, as shown in Figure 2323.  
In 2012 the unemployment decreased to 8,3% but it is still much higher than the pre-crisis level, 
that was, around 5%.  
                                                          
21 Source: Bloomberg. 
22 Source: Census Bureau. Value expressed in millions. 
23 Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics. The shadow areas highlight the Dot-Com bubble burst and the Financial crisis.  
19 
 
 
Figure 23    The unemployment index from 1992-2012 
 
As we can see, the Financial crisis had a bigger effect on the real estate market and on the 
unemployment than the Dot-Com bubble burst in 2001-2002. 
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2. THE FEDERAL RESERVE MONETARY POLICY TOOLS 
2.1 THE FEDERAL RESERVE CONVENTIONAL MONETARY POLICY  
The Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) was the Federal Bank organism, which enacted the 
monetary policy strategies24.  
The conventional instruments used during the financial stability were: 
 The Open Market Operations; 
 The Discount Rate;  
 The Reserve Requirements. 
Their implementation moved to the target level, set by the FOMC, the current Federal Funds rate, 
that is, the interest rate at which depository institutions lend reserve balances with overnight 
maturity to other depository institutions. It was extremely important because it affected other 
United States interest rates, including the prime rate, home loan rates, and car loan rates. 
 
2.1.1 The Open Market Operations (OMOs) 
The Federal Reserve could use various forms of Open market Operations, but the most common 
were defined as the central banks purchases and sales of government securities in the open 
market25, in order to expand or contract the amount of money in the banking system. OMOs were 
a key tool used by the Central Bank in the implementation of monetary policy due, in particular, to 
its flexibility.  
They were conducted by the New York Federal Reserve Trading Desk and regulated by section 14 
of the Federal Reserve Act which, moreover, limits the quantity to be sold or purchased. In addition, 
the New York Central Bank had to publish a detailed explanation each year in its Annual Report. 
Each open market operation affected differently the Federal Reserve's balance sheet, depending on 
its size and nature. 
The Open Market Operations could be divided into two types, i.e., permanent and temporary.  
Permanent OMOs (POMOs) involved outright purchases or sales of securities for the System Open 
Market Account (SOMA), i.e., the Federal Reserve's portfolio. 
Traditionally, these instruments were used to boost the longer-term factors driving the expansion 
of the Federal Reserve's balance sheet, that is, in particular, the growth trend of the currency in 
                                                          
24 Source: The Federal Reserve website, the “Federal Open Market Committee”. 
25 Source: The Federal Reserve website, Policy tools section. 
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circulation. When the Federal Reserve bought or sold securities outright, indeed, it could 
permanently add to or drain the reserves available to the U.S. banking system. 
In 2009, for instance, a POMO was announced consisting in a longer-dated Treasury purchase 
program. This program aimed to improve the private credit markets conditions after an 
unprecedented contraction due to the Financial Crisis26. 
Temporary Open Market Operations, instead, were the opposite of the POMOs. It could be 
implemented, indeed, to add or drain reserves available to the banking system on a temporary basis, 
influencing, then, the Federal Funds rate. 
These operations could be either repurchase (REPO) or reverse repurchase agreements.  
Considering a REPO operation, the Trading Desk bought a security setting an agreement to resell 
it in the future. The difference between the purchase and sale prices reflected the interest.  
Vice versa, considering a reverse REPO agreement, the Trading Desk sold a security and 
repurchased it in the future27.  
The Federal Reserve's approach to the implementation of monetary policy changed during its 
history, in particular from the financial Crisis, when the FOMC set the Federal Funds rate target 
close to zero. Aiming to create a more favorable financial environment and to support the economic 
activity, from the end of 2008 to October 2014, the Federal Reserve greatly increased its holding 
of longer-term securities through open market purchases, reducing the pressure on longer-term 
interest rates. 
Traditionally, though, buying and selling government bonds allowed the Federal Reserve to adjust 
the supply of reserve balances held by the banks and to increase or decrease the Federal Funds rate 
around its target level. In order to reach it, the FOMC was able to use Open Market Operations 
either to implement an expansionary monetary policy or a contractionary monetary policy. 
 
The Expansionary Monetary Policy 
The Federal Reserve actuated an expansionary monetary policy when the FOMC aimed to decrease 
the Fed Funds rate. The Central Bank purchased government securities, through private bond 
dealers, and deposited payment into the bank accounts of the individuals or organizations that sold 
the bonds. The deposits became part of the commercial banks cash and, therefore, increased the 
amount of money available to be lent.  
                                                          
26 The main aim, as we said before, was to reduce pressure on longer-term interest rates. 
27 Source: The Federal Reserve website, Policy tool section. 
22 
 
Commercial banks, then, actively tried to attract borrowers by lowering interest rates, reducing, 
also, the Federal Funds rate28. 
When the amounts of funds available increased, the interest rates dropped down decreasing the 
cost of borrowing, which meant that more people and firms had access to funds at a cheaper rate, 
as shown in Figure 24. 
This lead to less savings and more spending, that is, to an economy boost, lowering the 
unemployment. 
 
 
Figure 24        How the Federal Reserve conducts open market operations 
 
                                                          
28 Source: The Federal Reserve System Purposes & Functions, 10th edition October 2016. 
23 
 
The Contractionary Monetary Policy 
The Federal Reserve set a contractionary monetary policy when the FOMC aimed to increase the 
Federal Funds rate and slow down the economy. By selling government securities to individuals 
and institutions, the commercial banks amount of money diminishes, increasing the cost of 
borrowing and the interest rates, including, then, the Federal Funds rate29. 
When the cost of debt raised, individuals and firms were not incentive to borrow. They wanted to 
save their money since also the savings accounts interest rates and certificates of deposit (CDs) 
were higher. Entities spent less in the economy and invested less in the capital markets that means 
reducing the economic growth. 
 
2.1.2 The Discount Rate 
The Discount Rate was not a market rate but an administered rate set by the Boards of the Federal 
Reserve Banks and approved by the Board of Governors30. 
The Central Banks’ twelve regional branches, indeed, offered very short-term, generally overnight, 
loans to banks that were experiencing funding shortfalls, aiming to prevent liquidity problems or, 
in the worst-case scenario, bank failures.  
This lending facility was known as the “deposit window” that was different from the interbank 
borrowing, governed by the Federal Funds rate, actuated among the institutions which had deposits 
to the Federal Reserve. 
The Central Banks offered three discount window rates to depository institutions, each fully 
secured: 
 Primary credit rate; 
 Secondary credit rate;  
 Seasonal credit rate. 
Under the primary credit rate, loans to depository institutions showing a sufficient financial 
soundness were extended for a short-term period, usually overnight. Since it was the main discount 
program, The Federal Reserve called the primary credit rate simply the “discount rate”. 
Furthermore, depository institutions, that were not eligible for primary credit, had the possibility 
to access to the secondary credit, in order to satisfy their short-term liquidity needs or to support 
severe financial difficulties. In this case, the discount rate was above the rate on primary credit31.  
                                                          
29 Source: The Federal Reserve System Purposes & Functions, 10th edition October 2016. 
30 Source: The Federal Reserve System Purposes & Functions, 10th edition October 2016. 
31 Source: The Federal Reserve website. The secondary rate is set 50 basis points higher than the primary rate. 
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Both of these rates were set without regard to the market rates. 
In the end, seasonal credit was extended to relatively small depository institutions that had 
experienced predictable intra-year fluctuations in funding needs, such as banks in agricultural or 
seasonal resort communities. It was set every fourteen days averaging the daily effective Federal 
Funds rate and the three-month Certificate of Deposits rate over the previous fourteen days32. 
Moreover, the three lending programs rates were the same across all Reserve Banks. 
The discount window implementation increased during the Crisis due, in particular, to the sharply 
deterioration of the financial environment and the necessity of liquidity injection in the system. 
In August 2007, for instance, were actuated some temporary measures. The Board of Governors, 
indeed, reduced the primary discount rate from 6.25% to 5.75%, diminishing the spread over the 
fed funds rate from 1 percentage point to 0.5. 
In March 2008, furthermore, it was extended also the lending period from overnight to 30 days 
and, lastly, to 90 days33.  
As shown in Figure 2534, following the 2008 Lehman Brothers collapse, the discount window 
borrowing reached a $403.5 billion pick, after being on an average of $0.7 billion from 1959 to 
2006. The Federal Reserve were not the only Central Bank that implemented these kinds of 
measures. In general, other central banks have lending facilities similar to the American Central 
Bank discount window such as, for instance, the European Central Banks standing facilities. 
 
 
  Figure 15   Discount window borrowing 
                                                          
32 Meaning it is affected by the market interest rates. 
33 Nowadays it is once again used for overnight lending. 
34 Source: St. Louise Federal Reserve.  
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2.1.3 The Reserve Requirements 
The reserve requirement was a further tool that the Federal Reserve actuated to control the liquidity 
in the financial system. By reducing the reserve requirement, an expansionary monetary policy was 
implemented, and vice versa, when it raised the requirement, a contractionary monetary policy was 
actuated since it was cutting the liquidity in the system, causing an economy slow down.  
The Reserve requirements were defined as the amount of funds that a depository institution must 
hold, as reserve, against specified deposit liabilities. With respect to the law, the Board of 
Governors had the authority to change the reserve requirements and the depository institutions 
must hold reserves in form of vault cash or deposits with Federal Reserve Banks. 
The amount of a depository institution's reserve requirement was determined by applying the 
reserve ratios35 to an institution's reservable liabilities, defined as: 
 Net transaction accounts;  
 Non-personal time deposits; 
 Eurocurrency liabilities.  
 
 
Table 1           Liabilities Types and reserve requirements 
 
As shown in Table 136, Non-personal time deposits and Eurocurrency liabilities had a zero percent 
reserve ratio since December 1990. 
The reserve ratio on net transactions accounts, instead, depended on the amount of net transactions 
accounts at the depository institution. 
                                                          
35 The ratios are detailed explained in Regulation D of the Federal Reserve Board. 
36 Source: The Federal Reserve website, monetary policy tools section. 
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The 1980 Monetary Control Act37 set a reserve requirement ratio of 3% for a net transaction 
account value of $25 million. This “low tranches value” was adjusted each year, that is, from 18 
January 2018 the 3% reserve requirement was applied to reservable liabilities38 value between $16 
and $122.3 million and a 10% ratio if it exceeded the previous value39. 
The 1982 Garn-St Germain Act40, instead, exempted the first $2 million of reservable liabilities 
from reserve requirements. As reported in Table 241 also the “exemption amount” was adjusted 
each year, according to a formula specified in the Act.  
Nowadays, indeed, banks which had a liabilities value lower than $16 million were exempted by 
any reserve requirements.  
 
 
 
Table 2    2005-2014 Changes in Low reserve tranche amount and Exemption amount 
 
                                                          
37 Source: The Federal Reserve website, monetary policy tools section. “The Monetary Control Act” is a two-title act enacted in 
1980 that modified the manner in which the banking industry operated, by deregulating the interest rates paid by banks, 
revising reserve and deposit requirements, and raising the Federal Insurance Deposit Corporation (FDIC) insurance protection 
from $40,000 to $100,000 per account. 
38 That is, just to the Net transaction account liability type. 
39 Additional details on reserve requirements can be found in the Reserve Maintenance Manual and in the Federal Reserve 
Bulletin, the appendix of which reported historical reserve ratios. 
40 Source: The Federal Reserve website, monetary policy tools section. “The Garn-St. Germain Depository Institutions Act” was 
enacted by Congress to decrease the high pressure on banks, savings and loans which incurred after the Federal Reserve raised 
the interest rates in order to combat the inflation. 
41 Source: The Federal Reserve website, monetary policy tools section. The table is considering a time period from 2005 to 2014. 
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The Interest on Required Reserve Balances and Excess Balances  
The Federal Reserve Banks paid an interest rate on required and excess reserve balances according 
to Regulation D42, prescribed by The Board of Governors that reported the rules governing the 
payment of interest by Central Banks. 
The 2006 Financial Services Regulatory Relief Act authorized the Federal Reserve Banks to pay 
interest on balances held by or on behalf of depository institutions. The effective date was set on 
October 2011 but, through the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act, it was advanced to October 
2008. 
The interest rate on required reserves (IORR rate) was determined by the Board of Governors 
aiming to eliminate the implicit tax that reserve requirements used to apply on depository 
institutions.  
The interest rate on excess reserves (IOER rate) was also determined by the Board, but, 
furthermore, it gives to the Federal Reserve an additional tool for the monetary policy 
implementation.  
According to the Policy Normalization Principles and Plans adopted by the Federal Open Market 
Committee (FOMC), indeed, during the monetary policy normalization, the American Central 
Bank intended to move the Federal Funds rate primarily by adjusting the IOER rate43. The Board 
of Governors continued to adjust the interest rates on reserve balances according to the market 
conditions changes, as shown analytically in Table 344 and graphically in Figure 2645, which 
reported the Interest Rate on Excess Reserves and on Required Reserves evolution since their first 
issue in 2008 to the most recent one in 2018. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
42 Reserve Requirements of Depository Institutions, 12 CFR Part 204. 
43 For the current setting of the IOER rate, see the most recent implementation note issued by the FOMC. This note provides the 
operational settings for the policy tools that support the FOMC’s target range for the Federal Funds rate. 
44 Source: The Federal Reserve website, policy tools. The data were selected by the authors to have a clearer historic trend of 
the rates. The table is generally updated each business day at 4:30 p.m., Eastern Time, with the next business day's rates. This 
table will not be published on federal holidays. 
45 Source: Personal graphic elaboration of the historical IOER IORR Federal Reserve data. 
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Time Period Interest rate on excess reserves 
(IOER) % 
 Interest rate on required reserves 
(IORR rate) % 
2008-10-09 0,75  1,4 
2009-01-01 0,25  0,25 
2010-01-01 0,25  0,25 
2011-01-01 0,25  0,25 
2012-01-01 0,25  0,25 
2013-01-01 0,25  0,25 
2014-01-01 0,25  0,25 
2015-01-01 0,25  0,25 
2016-01-01 0,5  0,5 
2017-01-01 0,75  0,75 
2018-01-01 1,5  1,5 
Table 3      IOER and IORR Adjustments 
 
 
 
Figure 26      Interest rate on excess reserves (IOER rate) 
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2.2 THE FEDERAL RESERVE MONETARY POLICY DURING THE CRISIS 
The crisis in the global financial markets became particularly severe in 2008, leading the Federal 
Reserve to counter it, by implementing some particular measures, that is: 
 The Federal Funds rate cut, 
 The Extraordinary Liquidity provisions, 
 The Large Scale Assets Purchases (LSAPs), 
 The Forward guidance. 
 
2.2.1 The Federal Funds rate cut  
During a recession the Federal Reserve had to cover two important roles46 in order to counter the 
environment collapse. The first one was being the lender of last resort, that is, it had to provide 
liquidity to the system. Furthermore, it had the power to implement the monetary policy, that is, to 
manage the overnight interest rate, also called the Federal Funds rate.  
Manipulating the short-term interest rate, the American Central Bank could influence many other 
rates. Indeed, it could affect the private spending such as the consumption, the house purchases and 
the firm investments, increasing, then, the demands and stimulating the economy growth. 
The monetary policy was conducted by the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC), which met 
in Washington 8 times per year. It was composed by 19 participants, that is, the 7 members of the 
Board of Governors, nominated by the USA president and confirmed by the Senate, and the 12 
Federal Reserve branches presidents, nominated by each bank Board of Directors and confirmed 
by the Washington Board of Governors. 
All the 19 members participated to the Monetary Policy discussion but just 12 could vote. The 
permanent right of vote, indeed, owned to the 7 members of the Board of Governors and to the NY 
Federal Reserve president47, while, 4 of 11 Federal Reserve branches presidents, instead, rotated 
their right of vote each year. 
As shown in Figure 2748, starting from the left side, at the beginning of 2007 the Federal Funds 
rate level was still high. The previous year, indeed, the American Central bank started to increase 
it, aiming to normalize the monetary policy, following the expansionary period which conducted 
the USA out from the 2001 dot-cum bubble burst recession.  
                                                          
46 Source: “La Federal Reserve e la crisi finanziaria, quattro lezioni”, S. Bernanke, Chapter 4. 
47 A custom that reflected the financial authority of New York, considered the financial USA capital. 
48 Source: Personal graph elaboration, based on the New York Federal Reserve database. 
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Then, in August 2007, the Federal Funds rate target was set to 5, 25 %. As the financial market 
worsened in September, it was reduced by 50 basis points49.  
During the spring of 2008, the economy became weaker and the FOMC decided to reduce its target 
rate by a cumulative 325 basis points, leaving it at 2%50. The Committee held the rate constant over 
the summer, monitoring the economic and financial conditions.  
In October, though, the financial collapse intensified sharply, causing a further 100 basis points 
reduction in the target for the Federal Funds rate.  
In the end, in December 2008, as evidence of a dramatic economic scenario, the Committee reduced 
its target to a range of 0 to 25 basis points. 
In sixteen months the FOMC reduced the Fed funds rate close to zero, thereby entering in the 
unfamiliar territory of having to conduct monetary policy with the policy interest rate at its effective 
lower bound. That target range remained in place today, demonstrating the unusual severity of the 
recession and the continuous worsening of the financial markets. 
 
 
Figure 27      Effective Federal Funds rate (%) 
 
 
                                                          
49 One basis point equals one-hundredth of 1 percentage point, that is 25 basis point corresponded to 0,25%. 
50 Source: Monetary Policy since the Onset of the Crisis. August 2012 Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve System at the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City Economic Symposium Jackson Hole, Wyoming.  
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2.2.2 The Extraordinary Liquidity Provisions 
The American Central Bank implemented various unconventional tools, whose main aim was to 
satisfy the institutions liquidity short term needs by providing it directly to the borrowers and 
investors. In particular, the extraordinary provisions were:  
 The Primary Dealer Credit Facility 
 The Asset-Backed Commercial Paper Money Market Mutual Fund Liquidity Facility 
 The Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility 
 The Commercial Paper Funding Facility 
 The Central Bank Liquidity Swaps 
 The Money Market Investor Funding Facility 
 The Term Securities Lending Facility 
 The Term Auction Facility 
As shown in Figure 2851, the extraordinary liquidity provision had sharply boosted the Federal 
Reserve balance sheet. Moreover, in 2009 and 2010 many actuated programs were expired 
following the financial markets improvements. 
 
 
Figure 28    Selected assets of the Federal Reserve, August 2007–December 2015 
                                                          
51 Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, statistical release H.4.1, “Factors Affecting Reserve Balances,” 
www.federalreserve.gov. As the 2007-09 crisis intensified, the Federal Reserve introduced a variety of programs, expanding its 
balance sheet in the process, in order to address financial institutions’ need for short-term liquidity and strains in many markets. 
32 
 
The Primary Dealer Credit Facility 
The Primary Dealer Credit Facility (PDCF) was an overnight loan facility that provided liquidity 
to primary dealers, in exchange for a specified eligible collateral. The main aim was to support the 
financial markets functioning, through the supply of loans with maturity the next business day the 
conclusion of the contract52.  
Primary dealers, then, could borrow overnight loans through their clearing banks at the primary 
credit rate offered by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York.  
The program was implemented on March 2008, and was closed on February, 2010. 
 
The Asset-Backed Commercial Paper Money Market Mutual Fund Liquidity Facility  
The Asset-Backed Commercial Paper Money Market Mutual Fund Liquidity Facility (AMLF) 
implementation provided liquidity to U.S. depository institutions and bank holding companies53.  
The main objective was to support their high-quality asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP) 
purchases, from the money market mutual funds. The Federal Reserve program supported the 
money funds, which held such papers, to satisfy the investor reimbursement demand and, 
furthermore, it provided liquidity in the money markets, in particular, in the ABCP market. 
The program was implemented on September 2008 and closed on February 2010. 
 
The Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility 
The Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility (TALF) implementation fostered the market 
participants to meet the households and small businesses credit needs, through the issue of asset-
backed securities (ABS), fully collateralized by various types of loans, to consumers and businesses 
of all sizes54.  
Under the TALF, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (FRBNY) lent more than $200 billion, 
on a non-recourse basis, to certain AAA-rated ABS holders, collateralized by recent consumer and 
small business loans.  
 
                                                          
52 Source: The Federal Reserve System Purposes & Functions, 10th edition October 2016. 
53 Source: The Federal Reserve System Purposes & Functions, 10th edition October 2016. 
54 The Federal Reserve website, Policy tools section 
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The Commercial Paper Funding Facility 
The Commercial Paper Funding Facility (CPFF) implementation aimed to provide a liquidity 
backstop to U.S. issuers of commercial paper. The American Central Bank improved the liquidity 
in the short-term funding markets and increased the credit availability for firms and households. 
The Federal Reserve Bank of New York, indeed, financed the purchase of highly rated unsecured 
and asset-backed commercial paper from eligible issuers.  
The program was implemented on October 2008 and closed on February 2010. 
 
The Central Bank Liquidity Swaps 
The Federal Reserve also established some dollar liquidity swap arrangements with several foreign 
central banks. The collaboration main aim was to smooth the global financial tension, to support 
financial stability and to serve as a prudent liquidity backstop, by providing dollars to the foreign 
Central Banks 55 in exchange of their currencies. In this way the Europe financial institutions were 
able to issue findings to firms, which needed dollars for their activity and, vice versa, the USA 
financial institutions could offer foreign currency liquidity to their borrowers. 
 
 
Figure 29     Federal Reserve Balance Sheet, Assets, 2007-2011 
 
                                                          
55 Source: “La Federal Reserve e la crisi finanziaria, quattro lezioni”, S. Bernanke, Chapter 4. 
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As shown in Figure 2956 , the dark grey right side corresponded to the item “Interventions aimed 
to smooth the financial tension”, that is, it represented the liquidity swap between the Federal 
Reserve and the European Central Bank and other monetary authorities. 
Two types of liquidity swap lines57 were designed:  
1. The dollar liquidity lines,  
2. The foreign-currency liquidity lines.  
 
The Dollar Liquidity Swap Lines 
Aiming to smooth the huge pressure on bank funding markets, the FOMC authorized several dollar 
liquidity swap lines with foreign Central Banks, following the worsening financial system 
conditions. 
Indeed, in December 2007 and in May 2010 the policy tool was implemented towards the European 
Central Bank and the Swiss National Bank in order to provide in U.S. dollars liquidity. 
Subsequently, it was authorized dollar liquidity swap lines with other financial institutions 
including the Reserve Bank of Australia, the Banco Central do Brazil, the Bank of Canada, 
Denmark National Bank, the Bank of England, the Bank of Japan, the Bank of Korea, the Banco 
de Mexico, the Reserve Bank of New Zealand and the Monetary Authority of Singapore58.  
Furthermore, the Central Bank dollar liquidity swaps involved two transactions.  
Firstly, when a foreign central bank set its swap line with the Federal Reserve, it sold a specified 
amount of own currency in exchange of dollars, at the applicable market exchange rate.  
The Federal Reserve, thus, held the foreign currency in a foreign Central Bank account, while the 
dollars provided were deposited in a New York Federal Reserve Bank account owned by the 
foreign Central Bank. 
Secondly, the Federal Reserve and the foreign central bank were involved into a binding agreement 
that imposed to the foreign central bank to buy back its currency on a specified future date, whose 
maturity could be from overnight to three months, at the same exchange rate. At the conclusion of 
                                                          
56 Source: Federal Reserve Board. Billions of dollars. 
57 Source: The Federal Reserve official website. The Federal Reserve operates these swap lines under the authority of section 14 
of the Federal Reserve Act and in compliance with authorizations, policies, and procedures established by the Federal Open 
Market Committee (FOMC). 
58 Source: The Federal Reserve official website. Furthermore, in October 2013, the Federal Reserve and these central banks 
announced that their existing temporary liquidity swap arrangements, including the dollar liquidity swap lines, would be 
converted to standing arrangements that will remain in place until further notice. 
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the second transaction, the foreign central bank paid the interests, computed at a market-based rate, 
to the Federal Reserve.  
When the foreign central bank borrowed the funds obtained to its jurisdiction institutions, the 
dollars were transferred from its account at the New York Federal Reserve to the bank which the 
borrowing institution used to conduct its dollar transactions.  
The American Central Bank, moreover, was not a counterparty in the transaction between the 
foreign central bank and its borrowers, that is, it did not bear the credit risk associated to the 
probability of default of the institutions in foreign jurisdiction. 
In the end, the foreign currency held by the Federal Reserve was recorded in the asset side of the 
American Central Bank Balance Sheet. Since the swap had to be reimbursed at the same exchange 
rate used in the initial draw, the dollar value of the asset was not affected by the changes in the 
market exchange rate.  
The dollar funds deposited in the accounts that foreign Central Banks maintained at the Federal 
Reserve Bank of New York, instead, were a Federal Reserve liability. 
 
The Foreign-Currency Liquidity Swap Lines 
The second liquidity swap line was the so called “foreign currency”, aiming to provide foreign 
liquidity to U.S. institutions. The Federal Reserve, indeed, in April 2009 announced the 
implementation of this toward the Bank of England, the European Central Bank, the Bank of Japan, 
and the Swiss National Bank, providing to the American economy an amount of 30 pounds billion, 
80 Euro billion, 10 Yen trillion, and an amount of CHF 40 Swiss francs billion. The program 
expired in February 2010.  
In November 2011, the Federal Reserve authorized a temporary swap lines toward the previous 
Central Banks adding, moreover, the Bank of Canada.  
The Federal Reserve lines, then, constitute a part of a network of bilateral swap lines among the 
six central banks which allowed the liquidity provision in any of the six currencies. 
 
North American Framework Agreement Swap Lines 
A third swap line was implemented in 1994 toward the Bank of Canada and Bank of Mexico, 
authorized through the North American Framework Agreement (NAFA59). 
                                                          
59 The Federal Open Market Committee is asked annually to renew the Federal Reserve's NAFA swap agreements; draws on the 
lines also are subject to its approval. 
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The agreement foresaw a bilateral currency swap lines of 2 dollar billions with the Bank of Canada 
and $3 billion with the Bank of Mexico, aiming the promotion of an orderly currency exchange 
markets. These lines were established under the North American Framework Agreement (NAFA). 
The country of Canada has never drawn on its line, while the country of Mexico used its line in 
199560.  
In 1994, the U.S. Treasury established a 3 dollar billions NAFA swap line with Mexico, and  
 
The Money Market Investor Funding Facility 
The Federal Reserve implemented the Money Market Investor Funding Facility (MMIFF), for 
answering to the liquidity needs of money market and mutual funds investors, who suffered of an 
unusual high number of short-duration investments. 
The Central Bank, indeed, aimed to expand the secondary-market sales of medium-term 
instruments, such as certificates of deposits, bank notes and highly rated commercial paper, by 
offering an additional and longer term source of liquidity. 
In particular, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York authorized and supported61 five special 
purpose vehicles (SPVs) to purchase 600 dollar billions of short-term debt eligible instruments, 
from private financial institutions. Thereafter, the liquidity from the SPVs was used to support 50 
designated financial institutions, which were considered as short-term debt high-quality issuers by 
the industry leaders, maintaining, then, the funds liquidity conditions at an appropriate level.  
The MMIFF was announced on October 2008 and expired on October 2009. 
 
The Term Securities Lending Facility 
The Term Securities Lending Facility (TSLF) was a weekly loan tool, which allowed primary 
dealers, by pledging eligible collateral62, to borrow U.S. Treasury securities, on a 28 day term, held 
by System Open Account (SOMA). 
Its implementation supported the liquidity in the Treasury and other collateral markets, fostering, 
then, the financial markets functioning without affecting the currency or manipulating the security 
prices.  
                                                          
60 In 2018, it was increased the swap line with Mexico to 9 dollar billions. 
61 Source: The Federal Reserve website, Policy tools section. The Federal Reserve Bank supported the SPVs by loaning 90 percent 
of the purchase price of each asset to the SPVs, which issued asset-backed commercial paper to cover the remainder of the cost. 
As the debt matured, the MMIFF used the proceeds to repay both the Federal Reserve Bank and the MMIFF's outstanding ABCP 
debts. 
62 Source: The Federal Reserve website, Policy tools section. The eligible securities under the TSLF included AAA- to Aaa-rated 
mortgage-backed securities not under review for downgrade, and all securities available for tri-party repurchase agreements. 
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The program was operated by the Federal Reserve’s open market trading desk, which held weekly 
auctions. In exchange of collateral, the primary dealers submitted competitive bids and received a 
Treasury collateral basket, which included Treasury bills, notes, bonds and inflation-indexed 
securities63. 
The Federal Reserve initially pledged $200 billion to this facility aiming to decrease the liquidity 
pressure in the credit markets, specifically the mortgage-backed securities one.  
The TSLF implementation allowed institutions, including Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and major 
banks to access to highly liquid and secure Treasury securities, in exchange for lower safe and 
liquid eligible securities.  
The Federal Reserve tool was a bond-for-bond lending alternative to the Term Auction 
Facility (TAF) which, instead, was a cash-for-bond program which, indeed, injected cash directly 
into the market, affecting Federal Funds rate and negatively the value of the dollar.  
Furthermore, the TSLF was also an alternative to the mortgaged investments direct purchases, 
which counter the Federal Reserve main aim of avoiding the direct effect on security prices. 
TSLF was announced on March 200864 and was closed on February 2010. 
 
The Term Auction Facility 
After the Federal Reserve failed to achieve the wished result through the discount rate cut 
implementation, it collaborated with other Central Banks around the world and created the Term 
Auction Facility (TAF) instrument, whose main aim was to prevent a worst financial situation. 
The program, indeed, allowed the Federal Reserve to auction a fixed amount of collateral-backed 
short-term loans. The participants were depository institutions, such as savings banks, commercial 
banks, savings and loan associations and credit unions, which are judged to be in sound financial 
condition65, by their local Reserve Banks.  
The express tool purpose was to address “elevated pressures in short-term funding markets”66, 
allowing financial institutions to borrow funds at a rate that is below the discount rate.   
The participants was able to bid through the Reserve Banks, with a minimum bid set at an overnight 
indexed swap rate, relating to the loans maturity.  
                                                          
63 At the Federal Reserve's discretion, primary dealers were allowed to borrow up to 20 percent of the announced amount. 
64 The first auction was conducted on March 27, 2008. 
65 All depository institutions that were eligible to borrow under the primary credit program were eligible to participate in TAF 
auctions. All advances were fully collateralized 
66 According to a press release from the Federal Reserve System Board of Governors in 2007.  
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The first Term Auction Facility (TAF) was actuated in December 200767, in coordination with 
other Central banks, such as the Bank of Canada, the Bank of England and the European Central 
Bank, responding to the 2007 subprime crisis. 
The final Term Auction Facility auction was conducted on March 2010, expiring, then, the 
program. 
 
2.2.3 The Large Scale Assets Purchase 
In December 2008 the Fed Funds rate policy tool finished its effectiveness, since it reached a close 
to zero value and it was not possible to reduce it anymore. The economy, though, needed another 
boost because it was sharply contracting. The Federal Reserve, then, implemented a less 
conventional tool, that is, the Large-scale assets purchases (Lsap), also called, balance sheet tool 
or quantitative easing.  
The quantitative easing is an expansionary monetary policy, whose main aim was to influence the 
long-term interest rates, through the purchase of USA Treasury bonds and agencies Mortgage 
Backed Securities, granted by the government, such as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac68.  
The Federal Reserve, thus, implemented two quantitative easing, that is, the first one in March 
2009, also called Qe1, and the second one in November 2010, Qe2.  
As shown in Figure 3069, during the financial stability, the Central Bank traditional portfolio was 
already composed by a considerable amount of Treasury bonds, that is, more or less, 800 billion 
dollars. Following the Large-scale assets purchase implementation, though, the balance sheet assets 
boost was estimated in more of 2000 dollar billions.  
 
                                                          
67 The first two auctions conducted in released a combined 40 dollar billions of liquidity into the market.  
68 Source: “La Federal Reserve e la crisi finanziaria, quattro lezioni”, S. Bernanke, Chapter 4. All these securities were granted by 
USA government since they represented the federal debt, in the case of Treasury bonds, or they were issued by agencies that 
were granted by the government after went into administration.  
69 Source: Federal Reserve Board. The value are expressed in billions of dollars 
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Figure 30     Federal Reserve Balance Sheet, Assets, 2007-2011 
 
The basic idea of the program is originated by the American economist Milton Friedman, who 
suggested that, through the securities purchase, the Federal Reserve was able to reduce their 
quantity on the market, binding the investors to have a lower yield and, furthermore, to diversify 
its own portfolio. In other words, if the instruments supply decreased, the investor must pay a 
higher price to buy them, but the securities price and yield were inverse correlated. Implementing 
this tool, then, the Federal Reserve reduced the long-term interest rate on the Treasury bonds and 
on the Mortgage Backed Securities. 
In addition, the lower quantity on the market induced the investors to purchase other types of title, 
such as the corporate securities, reducing also their yield. 
A general interest rates reduction, then, boosted the entire economy. 
The Federal Reserve was able to purchase this huge securities amount by increasing the reserves 
that institutions hold to the Central Bank. Figure 31, indeed, shows the balance sheet liabilities side 
and, indirectly, illustrates how the Lsap program was financed.  
The liabilities increased to, almost, 3000 dollar billions but the currency in circulation, instead, 
remained flat during all the quantitative easing operations, that is, the supply of currency did not 
change. The light grey area, indeed, was stable while the dark area represented the reserves which 
cover almost all the policy implementation. 
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Figure 31     Federal Reserve Balance Sheet, Liabilities, 2007-2011 
 
Furthermore, looking at the entire Federal Reserve balance sheet, Table71 reported the major asset 
and liability categories. The conventional Open Market Operations and Large-scale asset purchases 
affect similarly the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet. Indeed, when the Open Market Desk at the 
New York Federal Reserve Bank purchased a security in the open market, the Central Bank assets 
side increased by its value. In order to balance the payment, a corresponding rise is recorded on the 
liability side, that is, the item “Deposits of depository institutions” increased72. 
 
 
                                                          
70 Source: Federal Reserve Board. The value are expressed in billions of dollars. 
71 Source: www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/bst.htm. More detailed information on the balance sheet is available on the 
website.  
72 The Federal Reserve’s balance sheet is published weekly reporting a great deal of information about the scale and scope of its 
operations. Market participants closely studied the evolution of the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet to understand important 
details about the implementation of monetary policy. 
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Table 4     Simplify version of the Federal Reserve balance sheet 
 
The effect of the Large-scale assets purchase tool was, in general, positive since all the interest 
rates decreased, in particular the 30 years mortgage one. But the monetary policy impact on the 
real estate market, instead, was weaker than the expectations because it did not sufficiently 
incentive the house purchase and, as consequence, the economy recovery.  
The Lsap implementation benefits, though, must be considered alongside its potential costs73.  
One possible cost can be related to the securities market functioning impair. The Federal Reserve, 
indeed, is law limited in the purchase of Treasury and agency securities, that is, the supply of those 
securities is large but finite. If the Federal Reserve became too dominant, the trades amount among 
private agents could decrease, leading to a liquidity degrade and to a price discovery. Since the 
global financial system depends strongly on the markets liquidity for U.S. Treasury securities, a 
significant impairment would be costly, and, in particular, could negatively influence the monetary 
policy transmission.  
For example, the market disruptions could lead to higher liquidity premiums on Treasury securities, 
which would counter the policy objective of yields reducing.  
However, even if market capacity could become an issue, during the policy implementation there 
were not any problems in the markets for Treasury or agency securities. Indeed, private-sector 
holdings of securities and trades between participants remained robust. 
A second potential cost related to the balance sheet tools implementation, was a possible reduction 
in the Federal Reserve ability to exit smoothly from its policies at the appropriate time. Such 
possible scenario might increase the risk of a costly distance from the inflation and its expectations, 
leading to a financial and economic instability. Anyway, the Federal Reserve avoided this 
possibility by greatly emphasizing to the public the tools develop, in order to ensure the future 
monetary policy normalization, even if the securities hold by the Central Bank remained large74.  
In particular, the FOMC demonstrated that it was able put upward pressure on short-term interest 
rates, by raising the interest rate paid to the banks holding reserves to the Central Bank or by using 
reserve-draining tools, that is, by selling securities from the Federal Reserve's portfolio. In this 
way, it would be neutralized the Lsap effect.  
                                                          
73 Source: Monetary Policy since the Onset of the crisis. 2012 Chairman Ben S. Bernanke 
74 Source: Monetary Policy since the Onset of the crisis. 2012 Chairman Ben S. Bernanke 
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In general, Non-traditional monetary policies are uncertain instruments and will probably change 
over the time, depending on the future economic scenario. In particular, the potential cost 
associated to their implementation could be more relevant than those considered for the traditional 
policy tools but, in the end, these were manageable, implying that a further future use should not 
be ruled out.  
 
2.2.4 The Forward guidance 
In the end, the Federal Reserve started to issue an additional tool to the investors, that, is, the 
“forward guidance” which provided no-binding information about the Federal Funds rate future 
trend, in order to influence the public expectations about the course of monetary policy. It is also 
called “communication tool”, which, giving more information to the financial market agents, 
reduced the uncertainty and, furthermore, increased the Federal Reserve credibility75. 
The forward guidance language assumed different forms and changed many times since the onset 
of the financial crisis.  
In December 2008 the Committee reduced the Federal Funds rate target close to zero and published 
its expectations in the post meeting statement, that is, “weak economic conditions are likely to 
warrant exceptionally low levels of the Federal Funds rate for some time.”  
As the economic impact of the crisis worsened, the FOMC changed its forward guidance helping, 
thus, the public to understand the Committee’s the future expectations about the policy course. 
In March 2009 the forward guidance was changed, disclosing that the Federal Funds rate could 
remain at exceptionally low levels “for an extended period.”  
In August 2011, the Committee used calendar dates in its policy statement, indicating the period 
over which the Federal Funds rate was maintained close to zero. As economic conditions did not 
improve in line with the Committee’s expectations, the forward guidance calendar date was 
extended. 
Later, in the December 2012 post-meeting statement, the FOMC replaced the last calendar date 
forward guidance with a language indicating the economic conditions and a variety of economic 
factors, that the Committee expected to see before it would raise the Federal Funds rate target.  
The FOMC’s communications about likely future settings of its target for the Federal Funds rate 
and its other policy tools have continued to evolve. In particular, since the Committee began to 
normalize monetary policy by modestly raising its target for the Federal Funds rate in December 
                                                          
75 Source: The Federal Reserve System Purposes & Functions, 10th edition October 2016. 
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of 2015, it has indicated that monetary policy is not on a predetermined path and that its policy 
decisions will depend on the policymakers conclusions about whether a change in policy is 
necessary to move the economy toward the two main final aims, that is maximum employment and 
2% inflation. 
The forward guidance was effective, since increased the public and private sector trust in the 
Federal Reserve monetary policy and furthermore, reduced the possibility to have a panic wave 
that was able to worsen the economic condition76. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
76 Source: “La Federal Reserve e la crisi finanziaria, quattro lezioni”, S. Bernanke, Chapter 4. 
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2.3 THE FEDERAL RESERVE MONETARY POLICY AFTER THE CRISIS 
The recession, that is, the phase of most economic contraction was declared officially concluded77 
in June 2009. In the United States of America, the organism which set the official date was the 
National Bureau of Economic Research (Nber) 78.  
As shown in Figure 3279 the recovery was very slow and weak. Considering the dark line, it 
represented the GDP trend from 2007 while the shadow area highlighted the recession period with 
respect to the Nber decision. The GDP real contraction, then, started in December 2007 and 
continued in the following months. In the half of 2009 the recession was officially over and the 
dark line, indeed, started to grow up because the economy expanded. 
Considering, instead, the past, the light grey line represented which would be the trend of the GDP, 
if, starting from 2009, the economy was growth following the average rate recorded after the 
Second World War recession.  
 
 
Figure 32      Average GDP and Real GDP growth 
It was immediately possible to understand that the recovery of the last year was slower than the 
previous recessions. 
                                                          
77 When a recession is considered over it does not mean that the situation came back to the previous level but that the 
economic has stopped to contract and started again to grow. 
78 Source: “La Federal Reserve e la crisi finanziaria, quattro lezioni”, Ben S. Bernanke, Chapter 4. 
79 Source: “La Federal Reserve e la crisi finanziaria, quattro lezioni”, Ben S. Bernanke, Chapter 4. The value are expressed in 
dollar billions. 
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For many economics, indeed, the 2007-2009 recession was the worst in the last 60 years, that is, 
they predicted a slow recovery, which, though, was even slower than the prediction resulting, 
further, in a sluggish resumption of the job market80. 
The Federal Reserve, then, implemented some other tools whose main aim was to stimulate the 
economy and, moreover, to drive the Federal Funds rate to its previous value.  
2.3.1 The Maturity Extension Program and Reinvestment Policy  
From September 2011 to December 2012, the Federal Reserve implemented a further balance sheet 
tool in order to provide additional support for the economic recovery.  
Under the “Maturity Extension Program” (MEP), indeed, the Federal Reserve purchased a total 
amount of 667 dollar billions of Treasury securities with remaining maturities of 6 to 30 years and 
sold an equivalent value of Treasury securities with remaining maturities of 3 years or less81.   
Its implementation was conducted by the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) which 
announced a 400 dollar billions program in September 2011, completed several months later.  
From June 2012 until the end of 2012, the FOMC continued the program purchasing an additional 
267 dollar billions in Treasury securities.  
The Maturity Extension Program, thereby, extended the average maturity of the securities in the 
Federal Reserve portfolio contributing to reduce the pressure on longer-term interest rates, without 
affecting the size of the its balance sheet 
 
2.3.2 The Open-ended asset purchases program 
In September 2012 the FOMC implemented first purchase program of MBS for an amount of 40 
dollar billions per month82. 
In January 2013, moreover, it was actuated a second operation for 45 dollar billions per month of 
longer-term Treasury securities.  
Subsequently the implementation and the conclusion of its first two asset purchase programs and 
the Maturity Extension Program, the FOMC to issue a third task that, instead, was open-ended, that 
is, it would continue to purchase assets until the labor market had improved substantially. 
In December 2013, assets purchase pace was reduced and the program expired in October 2014.  
                                                          
80 Source: “La Federal Reserve e la crisi finanziaria, quattro lezioni”, Ben S. Bernanke, Chapter 4. 
81 Source: The Federal Reserve System Purposes & Functions, 10th edition October 2016. 
82 Source: The Federal Reserve System Purposes & Functions, 10th edition October 2016. 
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Since the summer of 2010, then, the Federal Reserve has continued to reinvest the securities that 
mature. Maturing Treasury securities are reinvested in Treasury securities, while principal 
payments on holdings of agency debt and agency MBS are reinvested in agency MBS.  
By reinvesting, the Federal Reserve continues to hold a large amount of longer-term securities and 
thereby maintains downward pressure on longer-term interest rates, stimulating the economy. 
 
2.3.3 The Policy Normalization process 
The implemented Monetary Policy during the Financial Crisis was absolutely accommodative, 
aiming to support the economy recovery.  
In 2015 the unemployment rate was close to the levels that policymakers judged positively83. The 
Federal Reserve, then, started to actuate some steps to “normalize” the monetary policy, in order 
to continue to foster its macroeconomic objectives. The main aim, indeed, was to drive up the short-
term interest rates and reduce the size of the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet. 
In December 2015, then, the FOMC started to raise its target range for the Federal Funds rate by 
0, 25% percentage point, bringing it from 25 to 50 basis points. This was the first change since 
December 2008, based on considerable improvement in labor market conditions and reasonable 
confidence that inflation would rise to 2 percent over the medium term.  
In order to maintain the Federal Funds rate in its target range, the Federal Reserve used two 
administered rates. Indeed,  the interest rate the Federal Reserve pays on excess reserve balances 
(IOER84) is set equal to the top target range for the Federal Funds rate while the interest rate it pays 
on overnight reverse repurchase agreements (ON RRP) is set equal to the bottom range. 
Increasing them, the FOMC was able to put upward pressure on short-term market rates, including 
the Federal Funds rate. 
 
The Overnight Reverse Repurchase Agreement Facility  
In the Policy Normalization Principles and Plans issued on September 2014, the Federal Open 
Market Committee (FOMC) announced an overnight reverse repurchase agreement facility would 
be used, as supplementary policy tool, in order to control the Federal Funds rate and keep it in the 
target range85. 
                                                          
83 Source: The Federal Reserve System Purposes & Functions, 10th edition October 2016. 
84 We have already talked deeply about the IOER rate in point 2.1.3 of this Chapter. 
85 The Committee stated that it would use an ON RRP facility only to the extent necessary and will phase it out when it is no 
longer needed to help control the funds rate. 
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When the Federal Reserve conducts an overnight RRP, it sells a security to an eligible counterparty 
and simultaneously agrees to buy the security back the next day.  
This transaction did not affect the size of the System Open Market Account (SOMA) portfolio, but, 
in particular, reduced the reserve balances on the liability side of the Federal Reserve's balance 
sheet and a corresponding increase in reverse repo obligations. The FOMC set the ON RRP offering 
rate, which is the maximum interest rate that the Federal Reserve was able to pay in an ON RRP 
operation86.  
 
The Term Deposit Facility 
The Term Deposit facility was an additional tool whose main aim was to support the Federal 
Reserve monetary policy, by managing the aggregate quantity of reserve balances held by 
depository institutions87.  
The funds placed in term deposits were removed from the reserve accounts of participating 
institutions and transferred into a term deposit account at the Federal Reserve for the life of tool88, 
draining, then, the reserve balances from the banking system.  
The program was offer to all the institutions that are eligible to receive earnings on their balances 
account to the Reserve Banks. 
As the, the FOMC announced in the Policy Normalization Principles and Plans that the Term 
Deposit Facility (TDF) would be implemented to facilitate the control of the Federal Funds rate. 
The main objective was, indeed, to put upward pressure on it and to move it into the established 
target range. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
86 Source: The Federal Reserve System Purposes & Functions, 10th edition October 2016. 
87 Source: Source: The Federal Reserve website. Policy Tools section. 
88 Source: The Federal Reserve System Purposes & Functions, 10th edition October 2016. 
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3. LITERATURE REVIEW 
One of the thesis pillars was the BIS Working Papers No 514 “The influence of monetary policy 
on bank profitability”, developed in October 2015 by Claudio Borio, Leonardo Gambacorta and 
Boris Hofmann. The paper analyzed the link between monetary policy and bank profitability, 
focusing on the relationship between the interest rate structure89 and bank performance. The 
database taken by the authors was composed by 109 large international banks headquarters in 14 
advanced economies for the period 1995-2012 looking at the following variables: Net interest 
income, Non-interest income, Loan loss provisions and overall Return on assets (ROA). 
The analysis, moreover, is analytically supported by an adapted version of the Monti-Klein model 
and by an econometric model that provide the following results.   
 
3.1 The impact on Net Interest income 
The relationship with the interest rate structure was concave, that is, the impact on NII was stronger, 
in particular, at very low levels of nominal interest rates and, vice-versa, was weaker as interest 
rates move higher. 
Moreover, we had to consider four relevant mechanisms:  
i The “retail deposits endowment effect”;  
ii The “capital endowment effect”;  
iii The “quantity effect” that counterbalances the “price effect”; and  
iv The “dynamics effect”, including repricing lags and credit-loss accounting. 
  
The “retail deposits endowment effect” was related to the bank deposits, which were typically 
priced at the market rates. If their value became smaller as interest rates declined, then monetary 
policy tightening would increase the net interest income.  
The “capital endowment effect” was an extreme case of the previous effect. Thus, as interest rates 
dropped, the return on assets covered by capital automatically declined.  
Changes in the level of market rates had also a “quantity effects”, notably influencing the volume 
of bank loans and deposits. Moreover, the demand for loans was more elastic to interest rates than 
the demand for deposits then, at some point, higher interest rates would erode profitability.   
“Dynamic effects” can assume two forms: 
                                                          
89 Monetary policy operates primarily through its proximate effect on interest structure, that is, on the short-term interest rate 
through a direct effect, and the slope of the yield curve, through an indirect effect. 
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i The first relates to lags in price (rate) adjustments, possibly reflecting views that the 
changes in market rates were only temporary.  
ii The second form, which was more relevant, was related to the accounting practices. Any 
interest margin on new loans also covered expected losses. However, provisions, in contrast 
to interest rates, were not forward-looking. As a result, extending new loans raised 
profitability temporarily, since losses normally materialize only few years later, at which 
point loans also become non-performing, eroding the interest margin. This also means that 
if lower market rates induced more lending, they temporarily boosted the net interest 
margins.  
 
Beyond the level of interest rates, the slope of the yield curve should also influence the net interest 
income. Specifically, a steeper yield curve should have a positive effect on banks’ net interest 
income.  
As shown in Figure 190 the impact on Net interest income was stronger as the interest rate declined 
and considering the slope curve yield91, the impact was statistically different from zero until the 
slope reaches a value of three. 
 
 
Figure 2            Figure 3 
 
The econometric results, moreover,92 confirmed the previous graphical analysis. 
                                                          
90 Source: Claudio Borio, Leonardo Gambacorta and Boris Hofman calculations. The shaded area indicates 95% confidence 
bands. 
91 Source: Claudio Borio, Leonardo Gambacorta and Boris Hofman calculations. The shaded area indicates 95% confidence 
bands. 
92 Source: Claudio Borio, Leonardo Gambacorta and Boris Hofman calculations. 
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3.2 The impact on Non-Interest income 
Three components of non-interest income are relevant:  
i Valuation effects on securities;  
ii Hedging through derivatives;  
iii Fees and commissions.  
 
The relation with the interest rate structure was convex. This means that for lower value of the 
interest rate structure, the Non-interest income impact was higher, offsetting partially the Net-
interest income boost, as shown in Figure 393, Figure 494.  
The econometric results95, further, reported the negative impact of the short-term interest rate over 
the dependent variable, that is, the higher the short-term interest rate, the lower the Non-interest 
income.  
 
                                                          
93 Source: Claudio Borio, Leonardo Gambacorta and Boris Hofman calculations. 
94 Source: Claudio Borio, Leonardo Gambacorta and Boris Hofman calculations. 
95 Source: Claudio Borio, Leonardo Gambacorta and Boris Hofman calculations. 
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Figure 4            Figure 5 
 
 
 
3.3 The impact on Loan Loss provisions   
For given macroeconomic conditions, higher interest rates and a steeper yield curve slope should 
be expected to go with higher loan losses.  
Moreover, higher interest rate was likely to have at least two effects, which were partly offsetting. 
First, it boosted the default probability on the existing stock of variable-rate loans, by increasing 
debt service burdens. Second, they might induce less risk-taking on new loans through the so-
called risk-taking channel.  
Indeed, a key way in which monetary policy was transmitted was by influencing banks’ 
perceptions and attitudes towards risk, i.e. by influencing the market price of risk. 
Since the stock of variable-rate loans was going to be larger than the flow of new loans, then, the 
overall impact on provisions should decrease the profitability. 
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Furthermore, the sensitivity of loan loss provisions to interest rates should be expected to be 
especially high at very low interest rates, as shown in Figure 596. This was because, given central 
banks’ typical reaction function, such low rates were likely to prevail following financial crises, 
when banks’, as well as their customers’, balance sheets were in bad shape and then it made 
reluctant to accept further losses. The relationship between the slope of the yield curve and loan 
losses was likely to be qualitatively similar97, as shown in Figure 6.  
Both the results, moreover, were confirmed by the econometric analysis98. 
 
99  
Figure 6             Figure 7 
 
                                                          
96 Source: Claudio Borio, Leonardo Gambacorta and Boris Hofman calculations. 
97 That said, empirically, in this case, controlling well for background macroeconomic conditions is even more important: it is well 
known that a positive slope is normally associated with an expanding economy, possibly because of the anticipated central bank 
response. See Benati and Goodhart (2008) for a historical cross-country assessment of the predictive power of the yield spread 
for output growth and an assessment of different competing explanations for this stylized fact.  
98 Source: Claudio Borio, Leonardo Gambacorta and Boris Hofman calculations. 
99 Source: Claudio Borio, Leonardo Gambacorta and Boris Hofman calculations. The shaded area indicates 95% confidence 
bands. 
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3.4 The impact on Profitability 
The regression supported the analytical framework yielding the following main results.100  
First, it highlighted a positive relationship between the interest rate structure and bank profitability 
resulting from two contrasting forces. On the one hand, the level of short-term interest rates and 
the slope of the yield curve were positively associated with banks’ net interest income, reflecting 
their positive effect on bank margins and on returns from maturity transformation. 
On the other hand, higher interest rates boosted the loan loss provisions, affecting debt service costs 
and default probabilities, and depressed non-interest income, working on securities’ valuations.  
Second, we also found that the impact of interest rates on bank profitability was particularly large 
when they were low. All this suggested that, over time, unusually low interest rates and an 
unusually flat slope erode bank profitability. 
In the end, the impact on ROA was positive. That is, increasing the interest rate and the steep of 
the slope curve boosted positively the profitability until it reached a level in which the boost is 
equal to zero.  
 
Figure 8             Figure 9 
 
In addition, it was reported the econometric results101 which confirmed and supported the graphical 
analysis. 
 
 
                                                          
100 It was used a System Generalized Method of Moments (S-GMM) to estimate the regression in order to control for potential 
endogeneity. 100 Source: Claudio Borio, Leonardo Gambacorta and Boris Hofman calculations. The shaded area indicates 95% 
confidence bands.  
101 Source: Claudio Borio, Leonardo Gambacorta and Boris Hofman calculations. 
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3.5 Econometric framework  
Indexing individual banks102 with k, countries where banks were headquartered with j and years 
with t, it was carried out the econometric analysis using the following benchmark model:  
  
 
Where 𝑌 was the relevant profitability variable as a ratio of total assets.103 The monetary policy 
indicators were the three-month interbank rate (r), and the slope of the yield curve104 (𝜃), i.e. the 
difference between the 10-year government bond yield and 𝑟. These indicators were set in the 
equation also in quadratic form.  
Furthermore, several control variables were introduced: 
 The macroeconomic indicators in the vector C, that is, the growth rate of nominal GDP, 
stock market indices and house prices, have been weighted based on banks’ exposures to 
different countries.  
                                                          
102 The authors used bank-level data from Bank Scope, a commercial database maintained by Fitch and Bureau van Dijk. The 
data are annual.  
103 The analysis of the pre-tax profits is preferable in order to exclude possible effects due to different taxation regimes (Albertazzi 
and Gambacorta (2010)).  
104 The yield curve slope allows us to control for the effects of unconventional monetary policy. 
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 The coefficient of variation of the three-month interbank rate (σ) in order to capture 
perceived uncertainty about financial conditions.  
 A dummy crisis took the value of 1 in the period 2008-2012.  
 
In order to consider bank characteristics, we included a set of bank fixed effects (ϑk) and a vector 
of time-varying bank-specific indicators (X). The latter, in particular, were crucial in order to 
control for loan supply and loan demand factors. Indeed, this approach was based on the 
hypothesis that certain bank-specific characteristics, such as size, liquidity, short-term funding, 
cost to-income ratio and capitalization, only influenced the loan supply.  
Furthermore, it was assumed that banks differ in their ability to prevent a contraction in their loans 
or experience a drop in the availability of total deposits, i.e. from shocks following, in particular, 
a monetary tightening. 
In addition, small and less capitalized banks, which were penalized by markets, suffering 
asymmetric information, facing higher cost in raising non-secured deposits and may therefore 
have to cut their lending more substantially. Similarly, illiquid banks had less possibilities to 
shield their customers by drawing down cash and securities.  
 
Vector X, then, contains: 
i bank size, that is, the natural logarithm of total assets;  
ii bank leverage, that is, the equity-to-total assets;  
iii bank liquidity, that is, the liquidity-to-total assets ratio;  
iv the share of short-term liabilities;  
v the cost-to income ratio; and  
vi asset volatility  
 
One possible identification problem was endogeneity. Bank profitability could have an impact on 
the balance sheet items listed above as well as on monetary policy decisions. In order to overcome 
this potential firstly, all bank-specific characteristics were lagged. Secondly, dynamic System 
Generalized Method of Moments (S-GMM) panel methodology was used, which should yield 
consistent and unbiased estimates.  
In the end, understanding the link between interest rates and bank profitability was important for 
evaluating the effect of the monetary policy on the soundness of the financial sector. While 
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monetary policy was not, of course, the only influence on the interest rate structure, it has a major 
impact on it, since the central bank set the short-term rate and influences longer-term rates through 
direct purchases of securities and by guiding market participants’ expectations about the short-
term rate.  
The link between monetary policy and bank profitability became more relevant following the 
Great Financial Crisis. In the major advanced economies, indeed, the short-term and long-term 
interest rates were set to historically low levels but it is an under-researched area.  
Many papers analyzed the link between bank profitability and business conditions, producing 
results on the link between the interest rate structure and bank profitability only as a by-product. 
In particular, Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (1999) found that high real interest rates are 
associated with higher interest margins and profitability, especially in developing countries. Other 
examples include Albertazzi and Gambacorta (2009), who used aggregate data for the banking 
sector in 10 OECD countries, found a significant relationship between net interest rate income 
and the yield curve slope. They also highlighted a positive relationship between bank loss 
provisions and the short-term interest rate.  
Only few studies have focused specifically on the impact of interest rates on bank profitability. 
English (2002) studied the link between interest rate risk and bank interest rate margins in 10 
industrialized countries. He understood that, as the average yield on bank assets was more closely 
related to long-term rates than the average yield on liabilities, a steep yield curve raises interest 
margins. Recently, Alessandri and Nelson (2014) established a positive long-run link between the 
level and slope of the yield curve and bank profitability in the United Kingdom.   
The contribution of the Borio, Gambacorta and Hofman work, thought, was meaningful.  
First, it was analyzed the link in a deeply way considering a large set of international banks and 
all the main components of banks’ balance sheets. Second, for the first time it was assumed the 
non-linearity in the relationship between interest rates and bank profitability.  
This aspect had so far been neglected in empirical work but, if it was significant and ignore, it 
underestimated the effects of very low interest rates.  
A second important thesis’ pillar is represented by four seminars conducted by the former Federal 
Reserve Chairman Ben S. Bernanke to the Washington University in March 2012. The seminars 
were reported and translated by Adele Olivieri into a book entitled “La Federal Reserve e la crisi 
finanziaria, quattro lezioni”. In this work the author described the Federal Reserve from its origin 
to the Financial Crisis, trough the Second World War, analyzing successes and fails. In particular 
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the last two chapters are dedicated to the crisis consequences and the Federal Reserve reaction to 
the system collapse which, in addition to the work paper “The Crisis and the Policy Response”105, 
helped to understand the trend and the role played by the Fed funds rate cut that is analyzed deeper 
in Chapter 4.  
In the end, the Federal Reserve official website is used to argument the Central Banks policy tools 
during the period of financial stability106. Moreover, the sample data used have origin from the 
“Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council”107 (FFIEC), that is, a formal interagency 
body empowered to prescribe uniform principles, standards, and report forms for the federal 
examination of financial institutions by, between others, the Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve System and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
105 Chairman Ben S. Bernanke, January 2009 
106 https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/policytools.htm 
107 https://www.ffiec.gov/ 
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4.  THE DETERMINANTS OF BANKS PERFORMANCE 
4.1 THE FEDERAL FUNDS RATE CUT 
As deeply analyzed in the previous chapter, the Federal Reserve implemented many instruments in 
order to stop the financial crisis.  
One of the most important tools was to decrease the Federal Funds rate close to zero, that is, to 
implement an expansionary monetary policy, in order to boost the recovery of the economy.  
The reduction of the interest rate, indeed, aimed to reduce the pressure on the financial environment 
and to affect positively the other rates, such as, for instance, the ones applied to the car or house 
loan.  
The main aim, then, was to support the banks credit activity, in order to maintain liquid the system 
and to avoid banks run, due to the people panic. 
Its implementation, though, was not sufficient to smooth the great crisis consequences and, then, 
the American Central Bank used many other unconventional tools to face the collapse of the 
economic system. 
Aiming to understand the effect of the Federal Funds rate cut, it is analyzed its performance over 
four particular variables, which represent the profitability indicators of the institutions sample 
chosen.  
The benefit brought by the sharply reduction of the interest rate on the whole system is, firstly, 
represented graphically and, then, analyzes through an econometric model, considering the four 
dependent indicators. 
  
4.2 THE DATABASE CONSTRUCTION 
The sample is composed by the 50108 major American Banks109 with respect to the average assets, 
recorded on each 31 December 2017 balance sheet. The main source of the analysis is the “Federal 
Financial Institutions Examination Council” (FFEIC) database.  
It is analyzed deeply each single “Uniform Bank Performance Report” (UBPR), which is an 
analytical tool created for bank supervisory, examination, and management purposes, showing the 
impact of management decisions and economic conditions on a bank's performance and balance-
sheet composition110.  
                                                          
108 The complete list is reported in the Annex. 
109 Source: “Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council” website. From the website 19 institutions of the sample had an 
average asset recorded on the 31 December 2017, higher than 100-dollar billions while the other 31 was between 10 and 100-
dollar billions. 
110 Source: “Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council” website. 
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The data contained in the report can be used to evaluate the performance of the institutions reported 
and, furthermore, the adequacy of earnings, liquidity, capital, asset and liability composition. In 
order to smooth and to adequate the sample, some constraints are set. 
It is not considered, indeed, banks which have a number of offices less than one hundred, aiming 
to avoid the possibility to include in the analysis also the institutions, which main activity is 
investment banking. 
A second constraint is to delete the banks which don’t report some or all the financial statements 
related to the time period chose. We exclude, then, the Santander Bank of Delaware and the New 
York Sterling Bank from the database, reducing it to 48 banks111.  
The time period considered is from 2003 to 2012, that is, from the end of the bubble burst crisis to 
some year after the end of the 2007-2009 financial collapse112, when the Fed Funds rate was set at 
a low but stable level. 
Regarding to the dependent variable, four profitability variables are chosen, which could be mostly 
influenced by the Federal Reserve decisions, that are: 
1. The Net Interest income (NII) 
2. The Non-interest income 
3. The Net Credit Losses 
4. The Return on Assets (ROA) 
 
4.2.1 The Net Interest Income (NII) 
The Net interest income is defined as the difference between the revenues, which are generated 
from the assets of a bank and the expenses associated with its liabilities. Typical assets are 
represented by all forms of commercial loans, such as car loans, mortgages and securities.  
The liabilities, instead, are linked to the clients’ deposits.  
Regarding to the interest rate sensitivity, the Net Interest income is affected by its changes 
according, in particular, to the type of assets and liabilities held by the banks and, further, to the 
type of rate applied. Over loans of the same type, indeed, can be charged a variable or a fixed rate 
                                                          
111 It was not possible to find the Balance Sheet from 2003-2011. Just the available one, 2012, was included in the 
analysis. 
112 The period selected was chosen after an important analysis of the Fed funds trend. As is possible to check in 
Figure Chapter 2, the Interest rate reached a higher value immediately after an end of a crisis and is cut during a 
collapse. 
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and, of course, if the first one is applied, assets and liabilities are more influenced by its fluctuation 
than a fixed rate application.  
This environment was common during the years before the financial collapse. On mortgage loans, 
indeed, banks offered fixed rate but, further, adjustable rate. When the economy deteriorated and 
worker lost their job, it was not possible for them to repay the installments and, as consequences, 
banks Net Interest income had a huge reduction.  
Moreover, if banks held in their portfolio liabilities which repriced quicker or more frequently than 
the assets, it probably influenced negatively the profitability indicator. 
Regarding to the income statement of the institutions, the Net Interest income is computed as 
follow113: 
 
A) Interest and Fee on Loans 
B) Income from Lease Financing  
C) Estimated Tax Benefit 
D) Income on Loans & Leases (A+B+C) 
E) Us Treasury and Agency (Excluded MBS) 
F) Mortgage Backed Security 
G) Estimated Tax Benefit 
H) All other Securities 
I) Investment Interest Income (E+F+G+H) 
J)  Interest on Due from Banks 
K) Interest on Fed Funds Sold & Resales 
L) Trading account income 
M) Other interest income 
O)    Total Interest Income (D+I+J+K+L+M) 
 
The total interest expenses on liabilities, instead, is computed as follow114: 
 
                                                          
113 Source: “Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council” website – “Uniform Bank Performance Report”, income 
statement. 
114 Source: “Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council” website – “Uniform Bank Performance Report”, income 
statement. 
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P) Interest on Deposit in Foreign Off 
Q) Interest on Domestic Deposits 
R) Interest on Fed Funds Purchases and Repos 
S) Interest Trading Liabilities & Other Borrowings 
T) Interest on Sub Notes &Debentures 
U) Other Interest Expenses 
 V)   Total Interest expenses (P+Q+R+S+T+U) 
 
The difference between the Total Interest income and the Total Interest expenses, produces the Net 
Interest Income: 
 
 W) Net Interest Income (O-V). 
 
4.2.2 The Non-interest income 
The Non-interest income is defined as the income derived primarily from banks fees, including 
deposit and transaction fees, insufficient funds (NSF) fees, annual fees, monthly account service 
charges, inactivity fees, check and deposit slip fees, and penalty fees on credit card issuers115. 
When the institutions cover the role of the borrower, they charg fees on the loans issued. 
This is, then, considered an income, which generate revenues. The fees, indeed, represent the banks 
operating income, that is, the profit from daily and common business operations.  
The economic environment determines the degree to which banks rely on fees to make profit. The 
market interest rates, as we said many times, are driven by benchmark rates such as the Federal 
Funds rate. This rate determines the rate applied on the excess reserve (IOER) held to the Central 
Banks by the institutions. If it increases, banks make profit in term of interest income, but in this 
way, at a certain point, it could be more strategic to reduce the level of fees and charges, in order 
to attract new deposits than to invest in the excess reserves. 
During the Federal Funds rate reduction period, indeed, banks and financial institutions relied on 
non-interest income since it was considered as a strategic line item on the income statement.  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
115 Source: The definition of the profitability variables derived from personal studies, materials and from the common website. 
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The non-interest income is computed as follow116: 
 
A)  Fiduciary Activities 
B)  Deposit Service Charges  
C)  Trading Venture Capital Securitization Income 
D) Investment Banking Advisory Income 
E) Insurance and Commerce fees 
F)  Net Servicing Fees 
G)  Loan & Leases Net Gains/Loss 
H)  Other Net Gains/losses 
I) Other Non-interest income 
J)    Non - Interest Income (A+ B + C + D + E + F + G + H + I) 
 
4.2.3 The Net Credit Losses 
The Net Credit Losses is defined as the difference between the Gross Credit Losses and Recoveries 
held each year. Since the credit environment sharply deteriorated, this is an indicator of the 
creditworthiness of the bank’s debtors. That is, the higher the level of subprime loans is hold in the 
portfolio institutions, the higher will be the Net Credit Losses since the recoveries decrease and, 
vice-versa, the Gross Credit Losses increase.  
The following Net Credit Losses computation is available in the “Federal Financial Institutions 
Examination Council” analysis through its section called “Allowances and Loan Mix”: 
 
A)  Gross Credit Losses 
B) Recoveries 
C)    Net Credit Losses (A - B) 
 
 
 
                                                          
116 Source: “Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council” website – “Uniform Bank Performance Report”, income 
statement. 
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4.2.4 The Return on Asset 
The Return on assets (ROA) is a company profitability ratio, reporting an indication about the 
player efficiency in using its assets to generate earnings.  
The Return on assets, then, explains to the institutions, which is level of earnings, which derive 
from the invested capital.  
The indicator could differ between private and public companies, that is, when it is used as a 
comparative measure, it is more efficient to implement it among companies with similar structure.  
Deeply, the Return on assets is a ratio, which considers the Net income over the total assets. A 
higher ROA ratio is an important value for any kind of institution or company since it means that 
the assets held generate profit.  
The Net income is computed as follow117: 
 
A) Net Interest Income 
B) Non - Interest Income  
C)   Adjusted Operating Income (A+B) 
D) Non-Interest Expenses 
E) Provision: Loan & Lease Losses 
F)    Pretax Operating Income (C-D-E) 
G)  Realized G/L Held to maturity Securities 
H) Realized G/L Available for Sale Securities 
I) Unrealized G/L Equity Securities 
J)    Pretax Net Operating Income (F+G+H+I) 
K)  Applicable income Taxes 
L)  Current Tax Equivalent Adjustment 
M)  Applicable Income Taxes (K+L) 
N)   Net Operating Income (J-M) 
O)  Net Discontinued/ Extraordinary Items 
P)   Net Income Noncontrolling Minority Interests 
                                                          
117 Source: “Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council” website – “Uniform Bank Performance Report”, income 
statement.. 
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Q)   Net Income (N+O+P) 
 
Dividing each institutions Net income value by its total assets, it is reported the banks ROA in the 
model:  
𝑅𝑂𝐴 =  𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 / 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 
4.3 THE HYPOTHESIS  
The thesis research question is to understand the effect of the Federal Funds rate cut 
implementation over the variables previously explained. Before the analysis through the 
econometric model, we have to summarize the hypothesis regarding to the tool effect: 
 On the Net interest income, the reduction of the rate have to act as expansionary policy in 
order to boost the economy. All the rates such as the car and house loan rates should 
decrease, reducing, then, the cost of borrowing. The bank, subsequently, could start to be a 
lender again causing an increase in the Net Interest Income. The Federal Funds rate and the 
Net Interest Income, then, should have a negative correlation, that is, when the rate 
decreases the NII increases. 
 
 On the Non-interest income, instead, it is hypnotized a positive correlation between the 
Federal Funds rate changes and the variable considered.   
The rate reduction, indeed, should affect the banks income deriving from fees related to the 
normal business operation, eroding the Non-interest income variable. 
 
 The Net Credit Losses is linked to the ability of the borrowers of repaying their debt. As 
the market condition improves the variable value should be lower. The Federal Fund rate 
cut, as we said, drives all the other rates improving the market conditions. That is, a positive 
correlation between the independent and the dependent variable is expected.  
When the rate is reduced, also the losses from borrowers’ default is limited, improving the 
Recoveries and smoothing the Gross Credit Losses. 
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 The Return on Assets, in the end, should be positive influenced by the Federal Funds rate 
reduction. From the income statement, indeed, we can understand that the Net income is 
composed by the Net Interest income and the Non-interest income. Furthermore, we must 
add the potential realization of the Available for Sale Security and the Fair Value increases, 
due to the market improvement, that should drive up the Net income and, then, at least in 
the short period, the banks’ profitability. 
 
4.4 THE MODEL 
In order to understand the relationship among the Net Interest income, Non-interest income, Net 
credit losses, the Return on assets and the Federal Funds rate changes, it is set an econometric 
model.  
Since our sample is composed by 48 players and the time period considered is 10 years, we set a 
panel data model for each dependent variable.  
Moreover, in order to complete our analysis, other independent factors are considered, which have 
influenced our regression, that are, the quadratic Federal Funds rate, the USA GDP growth rate and 
Bank size, which could have a significant effect on the profitability variables. In particular, the 
GDP growth rate represents the richness of the country and if a recession, as the 2007-2009, 
happens, all the economy sectors are influenced, such as the credit market which, consequently, 
constrained the banks to be not more a money lender and, then, people can not have access to the 
credit, breaking the GDP growth, as shown in Figure 33118.  
A recession, then, reduces the banks’ profitability and increase the borrower’s probability of 
default.  
 
                                                          
118 Source: https://www.thebalance.com/us-gdp-by-year- 
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Figure 33      USA GDP Growth rate 
 
Regarding to the banks size, it is important to consider the changes in the sample total assets since, 
as said before, the financial crisis started as a real estate crisis but sharply became a financial crisis, 
deteriorating all the financial institution that had in their portfolio subprime loans and toxic assets 
which was not possible to be sold on the collapsed market.  
This, subsequently, affected the banks size and its growth with respect to the assets representing a 
contraction, as reported in Figure 34.119 
 
 
Figure 34     Sample Average Bank Size Growth YoY 
                                                          
119 Source: The graph is elaborated by the author, using the database.   
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Moreover, in order to have stationary variables, all the profitability indicators are divided by the 
total assets and are taken the logarithm of the bank size.  
That are, our expressions are: 
 
𝑁𝐼𝐼 = α0  + α1𝐹𝑒𝑑. 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 +   α2𝐹𝑒𝑑. 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒^2 + α3𝐺𝐷𝑃 + α4𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 
𝑁𝑂𝑁 = 𝛽0  + 𝛽1𝐹𝑒𝑑. 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 +   𝛽2𝐹𝑒𝑑. 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒^2 +  𝛽3𝐺𝐷𝑃 +  𝛽4𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 
𝑁𝐸𝑇 = 𝛿0  + 𝛿1𝐹𝑒𝑑. 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 +   𝛿2𝐹𝑒𝑑. 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒^2 +  𝛿3𝐺𝐷𝑃 +  𝛿4𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 
𝑅𝑂𝐴 = γ0  + γ1𝐹𝑒𝑑. 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 +   γ2𝐹𝑒𝑑. 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒^2 + γ3𝐺𝐷𝑃 +  γ4𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 
 
4.5 RESULTS AND COMMENTS 
4.5.1 Impact on Net Interest Income 
 
 
Figure 35      Average Net Interest Income 
 
Graphically it was reported in Figure 35120 the average Net Interest Income trend of our sample for 
the 2003-2012 period, which highlights a significant increase during the financial collapse and an 
important reduction before. 
The average Net Interest income of our sample is, then, extremely influenced by the Federal Funds 
rate trend both positively and negatively, confirming than the hypothesis of negative correlation 
between the dependent and independent variable.  
                                                          
120 Source: The graph is elaborated by the author, using the database.   
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Subsequently the bubble burst crisis, when the interest rate increased, indeed, the Net Interest 
Income decreased and vice versa during the financial crisis.  
The theory is supported by the econometric results121, which reports the Fed Funds rate coefficient 
significant at a 5% level. Furthermore, the analysis shows an interesting other factor effect. The 
GDP growth rate is more significant, i.e., at 1% level. It is then possible to understand how the Net 
Interest Income is positively influenced by the reduction of the interest rate but it is smoothed by a 
decrease in the USA GDP growth rate, which reduces the monetary policy benefit. The Bank size 
variable coefficient, instead, is not significance, that is, a change in the total assets of the sample 
don’t have any effect on the Net Interest Income variable. 
 
 
 
In Figure 36, it is reported the GDP growth rate and Federal Funds rate trends, which both show a 
significant reduction during the crisis period. 
 
                                                          
121 Source: Personal elaboration of the author, using R studio and the function “plm” which produced a Panel Data within model. 
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Figure 36     USA GDP growth rate trend and Federal Funds Rate trend 
 
4.5.3 Impact on Non-interest income 
Looking at the Non interest income trend, the initial hypotesis of a positive correlation between the 
profitability variable and the policy tool is confirmed both by the graph and by the econometric 
regression.  
Graphically it is reported in Figure 37122 the average trend of our sample for the 2003-2012 period, 
which record a down trend from 2006-2008, that is, the during the financial crisis and the 
implementation of the Federal Funds rate cut. 
 
 
Figure 37      Average Non-Interest Income 
                                                          
122 Source: The graph is elaborated by the author, using the database.   
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Furthermore, the profitability indicator start to increase when the interest rate was stabilized by the 
authority.  
The econometric results123confirm a 5 % level significant coefficient of the Fed funds rate which 
have driven the Non-interest income.  
Furthermore, we have an interesting result with respect to the Bank size. A reduction in the 
institutions total assets have a statistically significant a 1% level that have negatively influenced 
the profitability variable together with the implementation of the monetary policy, reported also by 
the Figure 38124 below. The GDP growth rate variable coefficient, instead, is not significance, that 
is, a change in the independent variable don’t have any effect on the sample Non- interest income. 
 
 
 
Figure 38     Fed Funds rate trend and Average Bank size trend 
                                                          
123 Source: Personal elaboration of the author, using R studio and the function “plm” which produced a Panel Data within model. 
124 Source: The graph is elaborated by the author, using the database.   
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4.5.4 Impact on Net Credit Losses 
In this case, it is not confirmed the hypothesis of a Federal Funds rate cut positive influence.  
Graphically it is reported in Figure 39125 the average trend of our sample for the 2003-2012 period. 
The highest pick was reach in 2009, when the system started to recover and people, then, could 
find a job and repay their loans. 
 
 
Figure 109      Average Net Credit Losses 
 
This behavior is justified by the econometric regression126 that illustrate a 10% significant level 
regarding to the monetary tool but, also a 5% significant on the GDP growth rate coefficient.  
That is, the Net Credit Losses is reduced by a cut of the Federal Funds rate but this is nullified and 
exceed by the sharply USA economic contraction. The Bank size variable coefficient, instead, is 
not significance, that is, a change in the total assets of the sample don’t have any effect on the Net 
Credit Losses variable. 
 
                                                          
125 Source: The graph is elaborated by the author, using the database.   
126 Source: Personal elaboration of the author, using R studio and the function “plm” which produced a Panel Data within model. 
72 
 
 
 
In the Figure 40127 below is reported again the graphical relation between the Federal Funds rate 
trend and the GDP growth rate highlighting the higher down trend of the USA economic indicator. 
 
 
Figure 40     USA GDP growth rate trend and Federal Funds Rate trend 
 
 
 
                                                          
127 Source: The graph is elaborated by the author, using the database.   
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4.5.2 Impact on Return on Assets 
Graphically it is reported in Figure 41128 the average trend of our sample for the 2003-2012 period, 
which record a sharply down trend probably due to the deterioration of the assets held in the 
portfolio banks and, then, by a reduction in the Net Income. 
 
 
Figure 111      Average Return on Assets 
 
This refuses the hypotesis of the Fed funds rate reduction positive influence and might suggest that 
the monetary policy implemented by the Federal Reserve negativly affected the Return on assets 
variable.  
To understand this interesting result and what really influnces the profitability indicator, it is 
necessary to look at the regression results129. 
From the coefficient results it is possibile to understand that the Federal Reserve tool 
implementation is not statistically significant.  
What is significant, instead, is the GDP growth rate at 10% but, further, the bank size at 1% level 
highliting that the down trend of the the Return on assets is determined by the reduction in the 
institutions balance sheet with respect to the total assets. 
 
                                                          
128 Source: The graph is elaborated by the author, using the database.   
129 Source: Personal elaboration of the author, using R studio and the function “plm” which produced a Panel Data within model. 
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The negative trend of the independent variables is also proved by the following Figure 42130, which 
isolates the sharply deterioration of the GDP growth rate and the bank size. 
 
 
 
Figure 42    USA GDP growth rate trend and Average Bank size trend 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
130 Source: The graph is elaborated by the author, using the database.   
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4.6 Conclusion 
The Federal Funds rate trend, during the period analyzed, covered a significant role in the recovery 
of the economy and greatly affected the profitability variables considered.  
Not all them, thought, were influenced. As the results showed, the Net interest income and the 
Non-interest income of the sample were mostly touched, while a lower impact was reported 
regarding to the Net Credit Losses and no effect was recorded over the Return on Assets. 
Focusing on the 2007-2009 period the produced results were interesting, since reflected the real 
weakness of the monetary policy implemented during the Financial Crisis.  
The history and the literature, indeed, reported several documents, relations and real experiences 
about the disaster due to the collapse of the system. 
The monetary policy implementation was not sufficient to smooth the consequences and, then, the 
Federal Reserve implemented many other unconventional tools, deeply illustrated in Chapter 2. 
Their implementations showed the limitation of the conventional monetary policy, due, in 
particular, to the dimensions and to the characteristic of the crisis, which were unique. 
The Federal Reserve and the whole world, indeed, considered the 2007-2009 financial crisis, the 
greatest faced since the Great Depression years.  
The base of the collapse could be individuated in the 70ies, when it was created the process so 
called “securitization”, which allowed the banks to pool the mortgages held in their balance sheet 
and to create a particular asset, so-called, Mortgage Backed Securities (MBS). This new tool was 
sold on the market to the investors, allowing the institutions to lend many other mortgages. This 
created a diabolic loop. The buyers, indeed, considered the investments free risk, since the 
underlying was the real estate market, always considered safe and unwavering. 
Moreover, the soundness of the market and the prospect of huge profits, often brought the 
institution to apply less tighten condition and to accord mortgages to not qualify borrowers.  
Figure 43131 reported a mortgage offers advertising example of the period prior the system collapse. 
Considering the poster characteristics, it is easier to understand the degree of confidence owned by 
the financial institutions. The type of mortgages offered, indeed, were: 
 The “1% low start rate”, that is, the first years just the 1% interest rate was charged on the 
loan issued. Nevertheless, nothing was declared about the following rates. 
 The “Stated income” granted to the borrowers the possibility to declare their income, 
without the constraints of providing any kind of documentation. 
                                                          
131 Ben S. Bernanke, “La Federal Reserve e la crisi finanziaria, Quattro lezioni”, Chapter 3. 
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 The “no documentation loans” meant that the lender would not have carried out any type 
of checks.  
 The “100% finance available” characteristic allowed the borrower to not provide an 
anticipation on the loans.  
 The “interest-only loans” stated the reimbursement just of the interest and not of the 
principal for the first years. 
 The “debt consolidation” let the borrower the possibility to consolidate their new mortgage 
with all their debt, such as the one on the credit loan, and to pay just the 1% overall. 
 
 
Figure 12 The credit constraints deterioration 
 
In addition, also the rating agency were less severe and granted the highest rate, that is the “AAA”, 
almost to all the banks pooled loans, which appeared free risk on the market.  
The Mortgage Backed Securities obligations, then, were not composed by the “AAA” loans but by 
lower rate mortgages, often “CCC”. 
When the borrowers could not pay the installments, though, the banks were not concerned, since 
the real estate market and the house prices continued to raise. They could, indeed, distrained the 
building and resold it without recording any type of loss. 
Nevertheless, the house price dropped down in 2007 and it was the trigger of the bubble burst, 
which had disastrous consequences.  
Banks started to be concerned about the borrowers who could not pay the installments, since it was 
not possible to resell them on the second market without recording a huge loss of value.  
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Moreover, also the prime borrowers, who could repay the mortgages, stopped to pay the 
installments, since their houses value were lower than the banks founding.  
Since the underlying assets value decreased, also the obligations worth sharply reduced to zero and 
the investors lost everything together with the banks, which had in the balance sheet a significant 
number of defaulted Sub-Prime loans. 
The securitization process was used by all the biggest banks in Wall Street and, as consequences, 
in the entire world, affecting the whole system. 
This is a brief and not exhaustive explanation regarding to the reason why all the economics and 
all the people life aspects were hit. The difference, indeed, with the previous crisis was related to 
the dimension of the “contagion”, which affected and put on the knees the USA, before, and, later, 
the global economic. 
As we said many times, one of the pillars of the collapse was the conviction of the soundness of 
the real estate market on which the USA economy was based.  
Further, this behavior brought to another fundamental cause. The authority and institutions, indeed, 
were more focused on promote the monetary and economic stability, instead of the financial 
stability. 
This consideration remembers the original mission of the Federal Reserve, which was created to 
reduce the financial panic episodes and to stabilize the system.  
During the Great depression, as deeply exposed in Chapter 3, the American Central Bank failed to 
be the lender of last resort and to reduce the pressure on the market. This time, instead, the Federal 
Reserve implemented many other unconventional tools in order to provide liquidity, avoiding a 
worst global scenario.  
Concluding, the Crisis and, in particular, the financial collapses will happen again together with 
the speculative bubbles, which will cause other instability situations. 
Nevertheless, according to the authority statements, the most important aspect is to remember, 
always, the experience and the potential damages, which could inflict not only to the financial 
world but, further, to the real life.  
It is fundamental, then, to implement and apply all the regulations needed, not only to prevent the 
crisis, but further, to relieve the effect ensuring the soundness of the system to sustain the impact. 
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5. ANNEX 
Bank Offices Average Assets 
Jpmorgan Chase Bank, National Ass.                                                       5161 2.130.627.250,00 
Wells Fargo Bank, National Association                                                                                   5746 1.731.097.750,00
Bank Of America, National Association                                                                                    4510 1.703.665.750,00
Citibank, N.A.                                                                                                           1056 1.400.615.000,00 
U.S. Bank National Association                                                                                           3094 441.942.589,00 
Pnc Bank, National Association                                                                                           2455 359.455.210,00 
Capital One, National Association                                                                                        615 286.392.319,00 
Td Bank, N.A.                                                                                                            1246 273.518.135,00 
Branch Banking And Trust Company                                                                                         2015 215.457.944,00 
Suntrust Bank                                                                                                            1282 200.158.145,00 
Hsbc Bank Usa, National Association                                                                                      231 196.202.747,00
Fifth Third Bank                                                                                                         1154 137.990.947,00 
Keybank National Association                                                                                             1196 133.167.310,00 
Regions Bank                                                                                                             1398 123.091.546,00 
Manufacturers And Traders Trust Co.                                                                                  784 120.316.899,00 
Citizens Bank, National Association                                                                                      796 118.662.163,00 
Mufg Union Bank, National Association                                                                                    356 117.810.474,00 
Bmo Harris Bank National Association                                                                                     538 105.037.642,00 
Huntington National Bank, The                                                                                            982 101.063.559,00 
Bank Of The West                                                                                                         541 85.971.932,00 
Compass Bank                                                                                                             647 84.258.874,00 
Santander Bank, National Association                                                                                     648 78.812.725,00 
Comerica Bank                                                                                                            437 71.546.569,00 
Zb, National Association                                                                                                 441 64.996.562,00 
People's United Bank, National Ass.                                                                           399 42.300.936,00 
East West Bank                                                                                                           119 35.781.842,00 
First-Citizens Bank & Trust Company                                                                                      530 34.156.909,00
First Tennessee Bank National Ass.                                                                                341 32.920.037,00 
Bokf, National Association                                                                                               124 32.761.915,00 
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Synovus Bank                                                                                                             246 30.658.319,00 
Frost Bank                                                                                                               131 30.369.937,00 
Associated Bank, National Association                                                                                    217 29.479.977,00
Sterling National Bank                                                                                                   128 29.064.474,00 
First National Bank Of Pennsylvania                                                                                      397 28.942.716,00 
Iberiabank                                                                                                               210 27.005.194,00 
Webster Bank, National Association                                                                                       167 26.264.925,00
Whitney Bank                                                                                                             198 26.176.836,00 
Umpqua Bank                                                                                                              297 25.106.844,00 
Commerce Bank                                                                                                            174 24.876.685,00 
Valley National Bank                                                                                                     208 23.437.615,00 
Prosperity Bank                                                                                                          244 22.325.816,00 
Tcf National Bank                                                                                                        321 22.082.531,00 
Bank Of The Ozarks                                                                                                       238 19.663.495,00 
First National Bank Of Omaha                                                                                             102 19.275.343,00 
United Bank                                                                                                              144 19.017.965,00 
Pinnacle Bank                                                                                                            112 18.727.848,00 
Chemical Bank                                                                                                            201 18.421.622,00 
Firstbank                                                                                                                118 17.121.240,00 
Arvest Bank 250 16.966.984,00 
Old National Bank 192 15.203.205,00 
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